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Abstract
A crucial concern of early-modern geometry was that of fixing appropriate norms for de-
ciding whether some objects, procedures, or arguments should or should not be allowed
in it. According to Bos, this is the exactness concern. I argue that Descartes’ way to
respond to this concern was to suggest an appropriate conservative extension of Euclid’s
plane geometry (EPG). In section 1, I outline the exactness concern as, I think, it appeared
to Descartes. In section 2, I account for Descartes’ views on exactness and for his attitude
towards the most common sorts of constructions in classical geometry. I also explain in
which sense his geometry can be conceived as a conservative extension of EPG. I con-
clude by briefly discussing some structural similarities and differences between Descartes’
geometry and EPG.
Une question cruciale pour la geome´trie a` l’aˆge classique fut celle de de´cider si certains
objets, proce´dures ou arguments devaient ou non eˆtre admis au sein de ses limites. Selon
Bos, c’est la question de l’exactitude. J’avance que Descartes re´pondit a` cette question
en sugge´rant une extension conservative de la ge´ome`trie plane d’Euclide (EPG). Dans la
section 1, je reconstruis la question de l’exactitude ainsi que, selon moi, elle se pre´sentait
d’abord aux yeux de Descartes. Dans la section 2, je rends compte des vues de Descartes sur
la question de l’exactitude et de son attitude face au types de constructions plus communes
dans la geome´trie classique. Je montre aussi en quel sens sa geome´trie peut se concevoir
comme une extension conservative de EPG. Je conclue en discutant brie`vement certaines
analogies et diffe´rences structurales entre la geome´trie de Desacrtes et EPG.
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Introduction
A crucial concern of early-modern geometry was that of fixing appropriate norms for decid-
ing whether some objects, procedures, or arguments should or should not be allowed in it.
Henk Bos has devoted his main book to this concern, which he understands as an “endeav-
our to clarify and institute exactness” (Bos (2001), 3). It focuses especially on Descartes
and the way he changed the “concept of construction”. It is, to my mind, the most valuable
study ever written on Descartes’ geometry and its historical framework. Though I widely
agree with Bos’ insight, I would like to discuss and partially contrast some of his views.
Descartes’ geometry is a conservative extension of Euclid’s, and providing this extension
is Descartes’ way of responding to the exactness concern. This is the main thesis I shall
defend in my paper. To introduce it, let me offer a preliminary clarification in three points.
The first point concerns what I mean by ‘Euclid’s geometry’. This is the theory ex-
pounded in the first six books of the Elements and in the Data. To be more precise, I call
it ‘Euclid’s plane geometry’, or ‘EPG’, for short.2 It is not a formal theory in the modern
sense, and, a fortiori, it is not, then, a deductive closure of a set of axioms. Hence, it is not
a closed system, in the modern logical sense of this term. Still, it is no more a simple collec-
tion of results, nor a mere general insight. It is rather a well-framed system, endowed with
a codified language, some basic assumptions, and relatively precise deductive rules. And
this system is also closed, in another sense (Jullien (2006), 311-312), since it has sharp-cut
limits fixed by its language, its basic assumptions, and its deductive rules. In what follows,
especially in section 1, I shall better account for some of these limits, namely for those
relative to its ontology. More specifically, I shall describe this ontology as being composed
of objects available within this system, rather than objects which are required or purported
to exist by force of the assumptions that this system is based on and of the results proved
within it. This makes EPG radically different from modern mathematical theories (both
2My restriction to plane geometry is not intended to imply that plane geometry is sharply distinct
from solid geometry for Euclid, or that this is so for the successive mathematicians up to Descartes.
This restriction merely depends on the fact that some of the claims I shall make about plane geometry
would apply to solid geometry only in the case of of a number of appropriate specifications, disclaimers,
or adjustments. As the consideration of plane geometry is enough for my purpose, I prefer then to limit
myself to it, for simplicity. For a number of relevant considerations of the matter of the relation between
plane and solid geometry, I refer the reader to an ongoing paper of A. Arana and P. Mancosu (who I thank
for sending me some preliminary versions of their paper).
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formal and informal). One of my claims is that Descartes’ geometry partially reflects this
feature of EPG.3
In both the early-modern age and earlier, EPG was the subject of many critical dis-
cussions. Still, these were generally not aimed at questioning it, but rather focused on its
interpretation, assessment, and systematisation. One might even say that EPG constitutes
the unquestioned core of classical geometry (as I suggest calling pre-Cartesian geometry as
a whole). A crucial concern of classical geometry was extending EPG, that is: looking for
appropriate ways to do geometry outside its limits. These efforts did not produce a closed
(in the sense specified above) and equally well-framed system as EPG, however, to the
effect that classical geometry appears neither as a single theory, nor as a family of theories,
but rather as quite a fluid branch of studies. This is my second point.
My third and main point is that things are quite different with Descartes’ geometry: this
is a closed system, equally well-framed as EPG. Descartes not only took EPG for granted
(Jullien (1996), 10-11) and based his own geometry on it, but also grounded this last
geometry on a conception of the relations between geometrical objects and constructions
that is structurally similar to that which pertains to EPG. This is the sense in which I say
that Descartes’ extension of EPG is conservative.4
Despite this strict connection between Descartes’ geometry and EPG, many accounts
of the former emphasise its novelties and differences with respect to classical geometry and
project it towards its future, rather than rooting it in its past. Though this is not the
case for Bos’ book5 (which also emphasises the conservative nature of Descartes’ geometry:
Bos (2001), 411-412), it seems to me that something more should be said on the relation
between Descartes’ geometry and classical geometry.
I hold that Descartes’ geometry is better understood if its structural affinities with
EPG are pointed out. Also, if this is done, its crucial novelties may, at least partially, be
accounted for as the quite natural outcome of an effort to extend EPG and get a closed
and equally well-framed system.
When things are viewed this way, Descartes’ primary purpose in geometry appears
3If I say that Descartes’ geometry reflects this feature of EPG only partially, it is because of reasons
that depend on Descartes’ geometrical algebra. This is a quite crucial matter, of course, but it is not
directly relevant for my present purpose. Hence, I shall not consider it in the body of my paper, and only
get to it briefly in the Concluding Remarks (section 3)..
4This sense is highly informal. In section 1.3, I shall clarify it a little bit more. In footnote (69), I shall
briefly consider, instead, the question of whether Descartes’ geometry can be said to be a conservative
extension of EPG in a closer sense to the technical one which is usual in modern logic.
5Another notable exception is a classical paper of Molland (Molland (1976)). Despite many local affini-
ties and a common emphasis on foundations, the views defended in this paper are, however, quite different
from those I shall argue for.
3
to be a foundational one, and his addressing the exactness concern appears as a crucial
ingredient of this purpose. This does not appear to be Bos’ understanding. He rather
maintains that the “primary aim” of the Ge´ome´trie “was to provide a general method for
geometrical problem solving” (Bos (2001), 228). I do not deny that solving geometrical
problems was a pivotal concern for Descartes. Still, I advance that it naturally arose within
his foundational program. I have just said (and I shall try to justify later) that Descartes’
geometry partially reflects the crucial feature of EPG that I account for by describing its
ontology as composed by objects available within it (rather than by objects which are
required or purported to exist). In my mind, this is enough to explain why Descartes
was mainly concerned with the solution of geometrical problems without arguing that the
Ge´ome´trie was primarily written for presenting a method for geometric problem solving
(however suitable and general this method could have appeared to him).
This view has another important consequence. The “general method for geometrical
problem solving” that Bos refers to is certainly not to be confused with the method “of
correctly conducting one’s reason and seeking truth in the sciences” which the Ge´ome´trie
is famously supposed to be an essay of (Descartes (1637); Descartes (AT), IV; Descartes
(DMML)). This last method is, even more famously, based on the clarity and distinctness
precept (Descartes (1637), 20, 34, 39; Descartes (AT), VI, 18, 33, 38; Descartes (DMML),
17, 29, 33). This makes it quite natural to think that Descartes’ concern for geometrical
exactness is the geometrical aspect of his quest for clarity and distinctness.6 Bos does not
explicitly endorse this thesis, but makes a very similar claim that would imply it if it were
admitted (as it is natural to do) that, for Descartes, clarity and distinctness are necessary
ingredients of the quest for truth and certainty. Namely Bos argues that “for Descartes
the aim of methodical reasoning was to find truth and certainty”, and that “in geometrical
context this quest concerned what I refer to by the term ‘exactness’” (Bos (2001), 229). I
cannot discuss this matter here. But I nevertheless observe that if, for Descartes, exactness
6The conceptual and methodological relations between the Discours de la Me´thode and the Ge´ome´trie
are far from simple and I cannot enter into this matter here. I only observe that in Descartes’ correspondence
one finds evidence for arguing both that he considered them to be strictly connected, and that he took
them to be relatively independent. As examples, I quote a passage from a letter to Mersenne from the
end of December 1637 and another from a letter to Vatier from February 22th 1638. “In the Dioptrique
and the Me´te´ores I merely tried to persuade [someone] that my Method is better than the usual one; in
my Ge´ome´trie, however, I claim to have demonstrated this” (Descartes (AT), I, 478; I slightly modify the
translation of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Descartes (PWC), 77-78). “I could not demonstrate
the use of [. . . ][my] method in the three treatises that I gave, because it prescribes an order for searching
things which is quite different from that I thought to have to use for explaining them” (Descartes (AT), I,
559; anew, I slightly modify the translation of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Descartes (PWC),
85).
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were the geometrical counterpart of clarity and distinctness, then clarity and distinctness
in geometry could not merely be a matter of rational conceivability, but should be strictly
intertwined with the satisfaction of constructive requirements that, as I shall show later,
directly derive from Euclid’s ones.
* * *
The present Introduction aside, the paper includes two main sections followed by some
Concluding Remarks.
Section 1 outlines the exactness concern with respect to classical geometry, and accounts
for the way it should have appeared to Descartes. For this purpose, I come back to
some known material that has been enlighteningly analysed by Bos, by emphasising some
aspects of it. In section 1.1, I distinguish exactness from precision, and also introduce
some terminology that I shall use later. Section 1.2 is devoted to EPG, by particularly
emphasising the role that problems and constructions have in it. This role explains why
a conservative extension of EPG requires the admission of new sorts of constructions and
new tools for solving problems. Section 1.3 offers different examples of the way classical
geometry extended EPG. This allows me to distinguish six different sorts of constructions
not admitted within EPG.
Section 2 accounts for Descartes’ views on exactness.7 The matter is introduced in
section 2.1, by considering Descartes’ attitude towards the mean proportionals problem.
Section 2.2 then provides a systematic account of his characterisation of geometrical curves,
whereas section 2.3 accounts for Descartes’ different attitudes toward the six different sorts
of constructions distinguished in section 1.3.
Finally, the concluding section 3 briefly accounts for some structural similarity and
essential differences between Descartes’ geometry and EPG.
1. The Exactness concern
1.1. Exactness Norms
The exactness concern for classical geometry was not a matter of accuracy. Accuracy was
certainly a requirement for practical or applied geometry, but the exactness requirement
concerned pure geometry, and was quite different8: whereas, for the purposes of practical
7On this matter, I also refer the reader to Panza (2005), 23-43.
8I emphasise that the question concerns pure geometry in order to make the distinction between accuracy
and exactness clearer. From now on, I shall avoid this specification and take for granted that ‘geometry’
refers to pure geometry.
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geometry, it was required to perform some (material) procedures with a sufficient degree of
precision, in pure geometry it was required to argue in some licensed ways. This is what the
exactness concern was about. In order to better explain this matter, I need a convenient
terminology.
I use the term ‘concept’ for short, to refer to what should be more precisely called ‘sortal
concepts’. In philosophical literature, there is no general agreement about the intrinsic
nature of concepts. Still, it is widely admitted that, whatever concepts might be, sortal
concepts should be such that the assertion that some objects fall or do not fall under them
is meaningful. Moreover, it is also widely admitted that each sortal concept is characterised
if and only if two kinds of conditions are attached to it: its application conditions and the
identity conditions of the objects that are purported to fall under it. The former are
necessary and sufficient conditions for an object to fall under this concept: an object meets
them if and only if it falls under this concept. The latter are necessary and sufficient
conditions for the objects that fall under this concept to be distinct from each other: if a
and b are objects that fall under it, a is the same object as b if and only if these conditions
are met.9
Fixing the former kind of conditions for a certain concept is not enough, in general, to
9A simple example can be useful to better explain this notion. Suppose that somebody, let us say Ann,
is looking to the sky and is willing to describe what she is seeing. She would presumably appeal to the
sortal concept of star. She would then say that some of the things she is seeing are stars, i. e. objects that
fall under this concept. If Ann wanted to be really precise in what she is saying, she should be able to
explain what makes something a star. Stating it would be the same as stating the application conditions
of the concept of star. But this would still not be enough, since Ann should also be able to explain what
makes one of the stars that she is seeing now the same as one of those that she was seeing yesterday.
Stating it would be the same as stating the identity conditions of stars. If Ann were actually able to do
both things, she would posses the sortal concept of star. But suppose now that, among the things that
Ann is seeing, there is one that she cannot recognise very well. She could then wonder whether this is
a flying saucer. Regardless of whether she would conclude that this is so or not, in order to be really
precise in what she is thinking, Ann should also have in mind appropriate application conditions for the
concept of flying saucer, and possibly also identity conditions for flying saucers. The appropriateness of
these conditions would not depend of course on the actual existence of flying saucers (more than that, if
these conditions, or at least the former of them, were not appropriate, it would be impossible to rightly
conclude that flying saucers do not exist, in fact). This should be enough for making clear that it is not
necessary that some objects actually fall under a sortal concept for a certain sortal concept to be clearly
identified as such. What matters is only that the assertion that some objects fall or do not fall under it
be meaningful and that the application and identity conditions be fixed, as said above. A last remark, for
completeness. The question of whether and how one could appropriately distinguish sortal concepts from
non-sortal ones is quite complex, and philosophical literature displays no general agreement about it. But
this does not matter for my purpose, since I use the term ‘concept’ only to refer to sortal concepts; as I
have clarified above.
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fix the latter kind of conditions. Moreover, this is not enough to provide either a warrant
that some objects actually fall under this concept or appropriate norms for obtaining some
objects which do. Again, fixing both kinds of conditions is not sufficient, in general,
to provide this warrant and these norms This sort of independence is realised in the case
of geometrical concepts involved in classical geometry.
Consider an example. For the sake of simplicity, it pertains to EPG, but it is evoked
here to account for some features of classical geometry as a whole. What I shall say about
it in the present section 1.1 is thus intend to apply, mutatis mutandis, to all classical
geometry. I shall specifically consider EPG in the following section 1.2.
Definitions I.19-20 of the Elements fix the application conditions of the concept of
equilateral triangle. They do it by stating that equilateral triangles are rectilinear figures
contained by three equal segments10 (I understand this statement this way: an object falls
under the concept of equilateral triangle if and only if it is a rectilinear figure contained by
three equal segments). These same definitions do not provide, however, identity conditions
for the objects that possibly fall under this concept. Moreover, they provide neither a
warrant that some objects actually fall under it nor appropriate norms for obtaining some
such objects. One might then doubt that these definitions would be enough to define
equilateral triangles.
As a matter of fact however, in classical geometry, fixing the application conditions
of a certain concept—a geometrical concept of course (that is, a concept under which
geometrical objects are purported to fall)—was considered to be enough to define such
objects. For example, definitions I.19-20 of the Elements were taken to be enough to define
equilateral triangles (in what follows, I will conform with this attitude and use accordingly
the verb ‘to define’ and its cognates).
Once a definition like this was offered, it was thus still necessary to provide the identity
conditions of the relevant objects, and a warrant that some objects fall under the relevant
concept, and/or some norms for obtaining some such objects. Returning to our example,
one might think that providing this warrant in this case would have been the same as
ensuring that the equilateral triangles exist. But this is not so in fact, at least if it is
admitted (as it is usual in modern mathematics) that, for a concept P , the P ’s exist only
insofar as they form a fixed domain of quantification and individual reference. This means
that admitting (or supposing) that the P ’s exist is taken to license both asserting that
some appropriate conditions are obtained for all of them taken individually (for example
that all of them, taken individually, enjoy a certain property), and denoting whatever one
of them with an appropriate singular term which rigidly refers to it (which entails that
10For my use of the term ‘segment’, cf. footnote (16), above.
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appropriate identity conditions are available for them).11
This way of conceiving the existence of the objects of a certain sort is quite natural,
I think. It is then natural to assert that the equilateral triangles that EPG is about
(i.e., the objects that are purported to fall under the concept whose application conditions
are fixed by definitions I.19-20 of the Elements) do not exist.12 A simple reflection should
convince us of that. Imagine two historians of mathematics who, on two distinct occasions,
relate the solution of proposition I.1 of the Elements, which asks one to construct an
equilateral triangle on a given segment. Suppose now that somebody were asking whether
they, by doing that, were speaking of the same equilateral triangle. More generally, suppose
that such a somebody were asking under which conditions one could speak of the same
equilateral triangle on different occasions, by relating some EPG arguments. It seems
obvious to me that both these questions are ill-posed, since EPG runs perfectly even if no
way to answer them is provided. More than that, there is no clear sense in which one could
fix the reference of a singular term for equilateral triangles in the language of EPG (for
example ‘ABC’) in such a way that it be taken to refer to the same equilateral triangle in
any one of its occurrences. For this same reason, it is inappropriate to assert that all the
equilateral triangles that EPG is about, taken individually, enjoy a certain property.13
What does it mean, then, in this as in other cases relative to classical geometry, that
a warrant that some objects actually fall under a certain concept (appropriately defined)
is provided? This means that it has been shown how to put one or several such objects
(distinguished from each other) at the disposal of a mathematician doing geometry for the
purpose of producing an argument about them. Now, in classical geometry, this is done in
such a way that it makes no sense to wonder whether the objects of this sort that a certain
argument is about are or are not the same as other objects that another, independent
argument is about.
11A simple example of this way of thinking is the following: admitting (or supposing) that the natural
numbers exist is taken to licence both asserting that they form a progression, and denoting one of them
with the term ‘1’ which refers to the same natural number in any one of its occurrences (note that saying
that asserting that p is licensed does not mean that p is warranted to be true, but just that it is ensured
that the assertion that p is meaningful).
12Notice that to say that the P ’s do not exist is not the same as saying that no particular object falling
under P can exist, or that no such object exists in a certain context. With ‘the P ’s do not exist’ I merely
mean that there is nothing like a definite totality of all the P ’s in the sense just explained. This point will
become clearer, I hope, on the basis of the following considerations.
13This does not mean of course that EPG does not include universal statements about certain sorts of
objects. The contrary is true: theorems in EPG are just such statements. Still, according to me, a theorem
in EPG does not state that all the objects of a certain sort, taken individually, enjoy a certain property. I
shall better explain this point at the end of section 1.2.
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Consider our example again. The warrant that some objects actually fall under the
concept of equilateral triangle is provided by the solution of proposition I.1 of the Elements.
I shall better explain this point later, since this explanation requires a distinction between
two kinds of geometrical concepts involved in EPG which I have not introduced yet. For
the time being, the only relevant point is that this solution exhibits a procedure, namely
a construction, that applies to any given segment and results in an equilateral triangle
having this segment as a side. Hence, if a segment is at the disposal of a mathematician
doing EPG, it is enough for her/him to apply this procedure in order to also have at
her/his disposal an equilateral triangle (having this segment as a side). In my parlance,
this ensures that some objects fall under the concept of equilateral triangle, though this
does not prove, of course, that the equilateral triangles exist in the sense explained above.
I also doubt that there is some other clear sense in which one can say that this proves
that the equilateral triangles exist. At most, after having constructed it, one can say that
a particular equilateral triangle is brought into existence. But then, one should also admit
that this triangle exists only in the context of the argument in which this construction
is involved, since no clear condition is provided for ensuring that this same triangle also
occurs in another, independent argument.
The same happens for the objects falling under any other geometrical concept involved
in classical geometry. For short, I use the verb ‘to obtain’ to mean the action of putting
some objects which fall under a certain concept (whose application conditions have been
appropriately fixed) at the disposal of a mathematician for the purpose of producing an
argument about them. This explains what I mean by speaking, with respect to classical
geometry, of norms for obtaining such objects. They are norms which the procedures to
be followed for obtaining these objects (that is, for putting them at the disposal of a
mathematician for the purpose of producing an argument about them) have to comply
with in order to be licensed. Hence, in order to provide the warrant that some objects
actually fall under a certain concept, one has to show how to obtain some objects that fall
under this concept through a procedure which complies with these norms.
Consider, once more, our example. The procedure exhibited by the solution of proposi-
tion I.1 is licensed within EPG because it obeys some constructive clauses explicitly stated
in the Elements, and takes advantage, in a way that is implicitly allowed, of the physical
properties of the relevant diagrams. It is then licensed because it complies with some norms
explicitly stated or implicitly admitted in the Elements. These are norms for obtaining
some objects falling under a certain concept. Namely they are those which are proper to
EPG.
In my view, the exactness concern for classical geometry was essentially that of provid-
ing norms like these. This is why I suggest calling them ‘exactness norms’.
Those proper to EPG were quite clearly identified. But this was not so for classical
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geometry in general. Not only did different geometers adopt quite different such norms,
very often these norms were left implicit, or made explicit in a way open to different
understandings. One of the aspects under which Descartes’ geometry is an extension of
EPG is that it includes appropriate exactness norms licensing obtaining some geometrical
objects that cannot be obtained according to the exactness norms proper to EPG. The
way that these norms are stated is also open to different understandings, however. Bos’
book is a major contribution to the effort of fixing the more appropriate and plausible
understanding. In the present paper, especially in section 2, I shall also try to contribute
to this effort.
1.2. Problems in Euclid’s Plane Geometry
In EPG, problems ask for constructions, and they are solved insofar as these constructions
are performed. These are constructions of objects which are required to fall under some
specified concepts. More precisely, in EPG each problem is a demand that one or more
objects purporting to fall under one or more concepts be constructed. For short, I say that
a problem which asks for the construction of an object falling under a certain concept is
concerned with this concept. The main purpose in stating problems in EPG is thus, in my
parlance, that of providing an appropriate specification of the concepts they are concerned
with.
The objects that EPG is about, or EPG objects, as I shall say from now on, are
points, segments, circles, angles14, and polygons of distinct sorts.15 The relative concepts
are introduced through explicit definitions that fix their application conditions. I have
already offered an example above. This concerns the concept of equilateral triangle. To
fix its application conditions, two other concepts are invoked: that of segment and that
14I use the term ‘angle’ to refer, in general, to rectilinear angles or angles formed by a segment and a
circle or two circles. For short, when I shall use this term to refer to a particular angle, I shall intend,
however, that it is a rectilineal one.
15The objects that EPG is about, or EPG objects, are, of course, objects that are purported to fall under
concepts whose application conditions may be fixed using the language of EPG. The inverse implication
does not hold, however. A simple example is enough to explain why. According to definition I.15 of
the Elements, “a circle is a plane figure contained by a line such that all the straight lines falling upon
it from one point among those lying inside such a figure are equal to one another” (I slightly modify
Heath’s translation: cf. Euclid (ECH), I, 153 and 183). It is enough to slightly modify this definition in
order to define ellipses (or to fix the application conditions of the concept of ellipse). It is clear however
that ellipses are not objects that EPG is about. Something similar can also be said for parabolas and
hyperbolas, and many other curves other than circles. I prefer then to say explicitly that EPG objects are
points, segments, circles, angles, and polygons of distinct sorts. More precisely, according to my use of the
term ‘EPG object’, for a geometrical object to be an EPG one, it is enough that it is a point, a segment,
a circle, an angle, or a polygon of some sort.
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of figure (since a triangle is a polygon, and polygons are taken to be figures). These are
introduced through definitions I.2, I.4, and I.13-14 of the same Elements. These definitions
are much less clear than definitions I.19-20, and have been the object matter of innumerable
comments and discussions. Still, for my present purpose, the subtleties involved in them
do not matter. What matters is rather that, in order to state the application conditions of
the concept of equilateral triangle, Euclid appeals to the concepts of segment and figure,
and supposes it to be clear what is meant for three segments to be equal and to contain
a figure.16 This is a simple example of the practice of introducing a concept by appealing
to other concepts already introduced. The concepts of point, segment, circle, angle, and
other kinds of polygons are also introduced in this way.17
Some problems in EPG are concerned with concepts like these. But this is not the case
of all EPG problems.18 Many of them (the majority of them, actually) are concerned,
instead, with concepts that differ from these insofar as the objects that are purporting to
fall under them are required to stay in some appropriate relation with other given objects.
To appreciate the difference, compare, for example, the concept of square with that of
square equal to a given rectangle or to a given circle. Of course, a square equal to a given
rectangle or to a given circle is a square, but it should be immediately clear that asking for
the construction of a square equal to a given rectangle or to a given circle is quite different
16Definitions I.2, I.4, and I.13-14 are well-known, but I quote them for the reader’s benefit. According
to definition I.2, “a line is breadthless length”; according to definition I.4, “a straight line is that which
lies evenly with respect to the points on itself”; according to definition I.13, “a boundary is that which is
an extremity of anything”; finally, according to definition I.14, “a figure is that which is contained by any
boundary or boundaries” (I quote Heath’s translations, slightly modifying that of definition I.4: cf. Euclid
(ECH), I, 153, 158, 165, and 182). Only two simple remarks are appropriate for my present purpose. The
former is that straight lines are generally finite, for Euclid, and this is the reason that I refer to them as
segments. The latter is that the notion of being contained by something, which is involved in the definition
of equilateral triangle, is already involved in the definition of figures, to the effect that, if definitions I.13-14
are taken to be clear, what matters, in order to have a clear understanding of the definition of equilateral
triangles, is admitting that three segments can provide a boundary or extremity.
17One might doubt that this is the case for the concept of point. To see that this is so, it is enough to
remark that definition I.1 is not enough to fix the application conditions of this concept. Definition I.3 is
also required for that. The former states that “a point is that of which there is no part”; the latter clarifies
this statement, by stating that “the extremities of a line are points” (I quote again Heath’s translations,
slightly modifying that of definition I.1: cf. Euclid (ECH), I, 153, 155, and 165).
18From now on, I call ‘EPG problems’ those problems that ask for constructions of EPG objects, by
requiring (often implicitly) that these construction comply with the exactness norms proper to EPG. A
usual and compact way to identify these norms consists in saying that they select constructions by ruler and
compass. In this parlance, one could say that EPG problems are those problems that ask for constructions
of EPG objects by ruler and compass. In what follows, I shall try to account for the exactness norms
proper to EPG in a more precise way, and I shall also explain why I prefer to use a different terminology.
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from asking for the construction of whatever square (i. e. of a square having any arbitrary
segment as its side).
I shall come back to this distinction later. For the time being, it is only important to
observe that—with only the exception of arbitrary segments and points, which provide the
starting point of any construction licensed within EPG (as I shall explain later)—solving
a problem is the only way available in EPG for warranting that some objects fall under a
certain concept,whether this concept is of the former kind or the latter. Construction is
thus the typical modality through which geometrical objects are obtained in EPG, and to
claim that some objects fall under a certain concept is, in EPG, the same as claiming that
some objects falling under this concept can be constructed in the appropriate way.
Accordingly, the sense in which it can be said, in EPG, that some objects fall under
a certain concept is manifested by the way in which EPG problems are solved. This also
displays the identity conditions of EPG objects, and the exactness norms relative to them.
A good way (the only way, in fact) for understanding this sense and becoming aware of
these conditions and norms is, then, by parsing the solutions of EPG problems. This is
what I shall briefly do in the rest of the present section.
EPG constructions require that appropriate diagrams be drawn. More than that: they
are just procedures for drawing diagrams in a licensed way, to the effect that an EPG
problem is solved when appropriate diagrams, representing some objects falling under the
concepts this problem is concerned with, are so drawn. I term constructions like these
‘diagrammatic’.19
19Proposition I.1 of the Elements invoked above provides a very simple example. As said, it asks for the
construction of an equilateral triangle on a given segment. In its solution, this segment is identified with
that which is represented by a certain stroke. Nothing compels someone who is performing or expounding
this solution to actually draw this stroke, of course (and presently I do not make it, in fact). But the
mere phrase ‘let AB be the given segment’ with which this solution begins (I quote Heath’s translation,
slightly modifying it: Euclid (ECH), I, 241) is understable only insofar as a stroke representing a certain
segment is imagined, if not actually drawn. This is because the way for identifying a single particular
segment within EPG is by taking it to be the segment represented by a certain stroke. Hence, the stroke
(either actually drawn or imagined) is needed to fix the reference of the singular terms ‘AB’, ‘A’, and ‘B’
(Netz (1999) 19-26). Once this reference is fixed, the construction can begin. One “describes” two circles
with radius AB: one with center A, the other with center B. Usually this goes with the actual drawing
of two contour-closed lines passing respectively through the two extremities of the stroke representing the
given segment, and representing these circles, in turn. Once more, this is not compulsory. But it is at
least necessary to imagine these lines. This is all the more evident because the construction continues by
observing that these circles meet in a point C, which, so to say, pops up, because of the physical properties
of the lines that have been drawn or imagined. This point is, indeed, represented by the intersection of
these lines, which provides the reference for the singular term ‘C’. Then, this point is “joined” with A
and B, respectively, which usually goes with the actual drawing of two new strokes that provide the actual
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The verb ‘to represent’ evokes a complex relation. I only emphasize here that diagrams
provide the identity conditions of the objects they represent. This means that, within
an argument concerned with several EPG objects, these are distinct insofar as they are
represented, or supposed to be represented, by distinct diagrams or sub-diagrams.20
A natural question arises then: how do diagrams differ from each other in EPG? It
is not easy to answer, in general. For example, there is no clear response to the question
of whether one can draw the same diagram twice, that is, whether diagrams are tokens
or types.21 I prefer to consider them as tokens. But, for my present argument, this
reference of the new singular terms ‘CA’ and ‘CB’. Again, these can be only imagined. But whether they
are actually drawn or only imagined, they are needed in order to fix the reference of the other singular term
‘ABC’ that is supposed to denote the equilateral triangle that is constructed this way. What I refer to with
the term ‘diagram’ is just the system composed of the three strokes representing the sides of this triangle
and the two contour-closed lines whose intersection represents the point C. Of course, one can deny that
Euclid’s solution involves three particular single segments, a particular circle, and a particular equilateral
triangle, and then that ‘AB’, ‘A’, ‘B’, etc. have to be understood as genuine singular terms. One can
think, rather, that this solution concerns the very concepts of segment, circle, and equilateral triangle, or
something like the corresponding schemas. Alternatively, one can think that ‘AB’, ‘A’, ‘B’, etc. are genuine
singular terms referring to abstract objects implicitly defined by the deductive rules that terms like those
submit to, and that diagrams enter into Euclid’s arguments only as a convenient but nonessential visual
support of a completely independent syntax. I cannot argue here against these interpretations, which I
think to be simply unfaithful to Euclid’s text and to the way it has been understood in classical geometry.
I limit myself to adhering to another view (which is quite common, in fact), and to emphasising the role
that, according to this view, one has to confer to diagrams within EPG. For more details on this matter, I
cannot but refer the reader to another paper of mine: Panza (TRD). For a survey of the recent discussion
on the role of diagrams in Euclid’s geometry updated to 2008, cf. also Manders (2008).
20For the connoisseurs, I add that I take EPG objects to be quasi-concrete ones in Parson’s sense (Parsons
(2008), § 7 and ch. 5). These are abstract objects “distinguished by the fact that they have an intrinsic
relation to the concrete” (which he also calls ‘representation’), to the effect that they are “determined” by
some concrete objects which provide “concrete embodiments” of them (ibid. 33). This does not entail that
the identity conditions of quasi-concrete objects are those of their concrete counterparts. This is typical
of EPG objects, in my view.
21In philosophical literature, the distinction types/tokens is, broadly speaking, that between an abstract
object conceived as a general template, and its particular instances, the things that are taken to satisfy
this template. A very nice example is offered by L. Wetzel in her article on this matter in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens/). Take G. Stein’s verse in her
poem Sacred Emily : ‘Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose’. How many words are there in it? One can answer
that there are three words: ‘rose’, ‘is’ and ‘a’. But one can also say that there are ten words, since ‘rose’
has four occurrences, and ‘is’ and ‘a’ three occurrences each. In the former case, one is counting types;
in the latter one is counting tokens. In the same way, one can also say that the concrete inscription of
Stein’s verse that the reader has in front to her/his eyes is a token whose type is this verse itself. The
question concerning EPG diagrams is then whether one should take the term ‘diagrams’ to refer to concrete
inscriptions made on concrete sheets of paper or on some other supports, or to refer to some template of
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is not essential. What matters is that considering them as tokens and admitting that,
in a single diagram, different appropriate sub-diagrams represent different objects allows
(some possible unimportant exceptions apart) conducting EPG arguments.22 In other
terms, EPG works perfectly (these exceptions aside) if the diagrams involved in it are
considered as tokens.23 The only identity conditions that diagrams confer to EPG objects
are thus local—that is, relative to single arguments—and no other identity conditions
for geometrical objects are available in EPG. It follows that EPG objects do not form a
fixed domain of quantification and individual reference, in the sense explained in section
1.1: they are not pieces of basic furniture, somehow steady so that geometers might refer
to them individually, using appropriate terms endowed with a rigid reference. They are
merely objects that fall under some concepts and enter into particular arguments insofar
they are represented, or supposed to be represented, by appropriate diagrams. And each
time one wants to refer individually to some of them within a new argument, they have
to be obtained, or to be supposed to have been obtained anew, by drawing appropriate
diagrams.
This is a crucial fact about EPG and makes it structurally different from modern math-
ematical theories, as anticipated in the Introduction. But what is even more relevant for my
present purpose is that this makes it so that exactness norms are an essential ingredient of
EPG. Insofar as EPG objects are obtained by construction, these are norms for performing
constructions. Hence, to account for them, we have to consider how constructions work in
EPG.
I have just said that constructions in EPG are diagrammatic. This means that the
clauses they obey (i.e., the stipulations licensing their successive steps) are nothing but
rules for drawing diagrams and for ascribing to them the power of representing certain ge-
ometric objects having certain relations to one another. Different systems of such clauses
correspond to different sorts of diagrammatic constructions. The constructions entering
into EPG obey a system of clauses like these, either explicitly stated in the Elements (es-
sentially through postulates I.1, I.2 and I.3), or implicitly but systematically admitted.24
which these inscriptions are instances.
22Exceptions occur in some very particular cases like when, for practical convenience, throughout the
course of a single argument, a diagram is reproduced several times under the convention that it remains
the same, or represents the same objects.
23Of course, nothing would forbid one to consider, for example, that each reformulation of the solution of
proposition I.1 involves different instances of the same diagram. The point is that this would be a useless
convention, a convention that is not required for EPG to work. Hence it would not be part of it, but
imposed on it from outside.
24The simple example considered in footnote (19) provides a clear illustration of some of these norms.
Insofar as proposition I.1 is the first proposition of the Elements, the mere fact that the construction
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These constructions are usually termed ‘by ruler and compass’. Still, rulers and compasses
do not occur in Euclid’s exposition. This name rather depends on a particular understand-
ing which is an essential ingredient of Descartes’ geometry. Hence, I prefer to use it only
for accounting for this last understanding. For a more neutral use, I suggest terming these
constructions ‘elementary’. Using this parlance, one can then say that EPG exactness
norms reduce to a general requirement according to which an EPG object is obtained if
and only if it is represented by a diagram that has been drawn (or at least imagined as
having been drawn)25 according to the clauses of elementary constructions.
This is equivalent to adding a supplementary condition to the problems advanced in
EPG, a condition which characterises EPG problems in general.26 Hence, solving such
a problem is more than constructing some appropriate objects; it is constructing these
objects through an elementary construction. This is then more than providing a warrant
that some objects fall under the relevant concepts; it is proving that objects falling under
these concepts can be so constructed, that is, that they are available within EPG, as I
suggest to say.27
entering into its solution starts with the admission that a stroke representing a segment is drawn (or
imagined to be drawn) shows that constructions in EPG can begin with such an admission. This is a
first implicit constructive clause (better, it is a particular case of a more general constructive clause to
which I shall come back later). The second step in the construction—the description of the two circles of
radius AB represented by two contour-closed lines passing respectively through the two extremities of this
stroke—obeys another clause, explicitly stated by postulate I.3. These contour-closed lines cut each other.
A third constructive clause, implicit again, allows taking their intersection as representing a point that
is ipso-facto constructed insofar as these two circles are so. The last step—in which this point is joined
respectively to the points A and B by two segments represented by two new strokes—obeys a further
clause, explicitly stated by postulate I.1. Finally, a last implicit clause allows taking the system of the
three previous strokes as a representation of a triangles that is then proved to be equilateral.
25Cf. footnote (19), above.
26Cf. footnote (18), above.
27Harari has argued against Zeuthen’s classical “existential interpretation” of Euclid’s constructions
(Harari (2003); Zeuthen (1896)). According to her, this interpretation assigns to Euclid three theses that
he does not actually endorse, namely that: i) “the correspondence between a defined term and the reality
to which it refers cannot be taken for granted, but it rather should be established by means of proofs”
(Harari (2003), 4); ii) geometrical constructions are “means of justification, i. e., [. . . ] logical procedure[s]
[. . . ] aimed at establishing the truth-value of a given content” (ibid., 5); iii) they are also “means of
ascertaining an already given content”, that is, “means of instantiating a universal concept (ibid., 14). In
opposition to (iii), Harari also argues that: iv) for Euclid, constructions are “positive means contributing
content” (ibid.), both insofar as they are “means of measurement by which quantitative relations are
deduced”, and as they exhibit or generate “spatial relations” (ibid., 1 and 21-22). I agree that Euclid does
not endorse (i)-(iii), if the terms “reality” and “content” in (i) and (iii), respectively, are taken to refer
to something existing in the sense explained in section 1.1, and this same last term in (ii) is taken to refer
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To better clarify this point, one has to remark that, as anticipated above, EPG problems
are concerned with two kinds of concepts. The former, which I term ‘unconditional’, are
such that the objects that are purporting to fall under them are not required to stay
in some appropriate relation with other given objects. This is the case, for example, of
the concepts of point, segment, equilateral triangle, or square. The latter, which I term
‘conditional’ are such that the objects that are purporting to fall under them are required to
stay in some appropriate relations with other given objects. This is the case, for example,
of the concepts of point cutting a given segment in extreme and mean ratio, of segment
perpendicular to another given segment, of equilateral triangle equal to another given
triangle, of square equal to a given rectangle, or to a given circle. For short, I also term
geometrical objects ‘unconditional’ and ‘conditional’ according whether they are purported
to fall under unconditional and conditional concepts, respectively.
Suppose that PU is an unconditional concept, for example the concept of square, and PC
a conditional concept specifying PU in some way, for example the concept of square equal
to a given circle. From the fact that unconditional objects falling under PU are available
within EPG it does not follow, of course, that also conditional objects falling under PC are
so. The opposite holds, instead, conditional objects falling under PC are available within
EPG only if unconditional objects falling under PU are so. Hence, one could say that the
basic ontology of EPG is formed by unconditional objects available within it, whereas the
relational arrangement of this ontology depends on which conditional objects are available
within it.
To appreciate the significance of this distinction it is essential to clarify what is meant
in the language of EPG by saying that a certain object is given. The verb ‘to give [δι´δωµι]’,
especially its past participle ‘given’ (that is, the different forms of the aorist passive par-
ticiple, in Greek), is typically used in the Elements to indicate the starting stage of a
particular construction. If some objects are said to be given, a particular construction is
licensed to start from them. This means that the diagrams representing the objects to be
constructed have to be drawn starting from those which represent these objects. In the
Data, ‘given’ is used in a broader sense, so as to label any geometrical object that has
been or could be constructed (through an elementary construction) on the basis of some
other given ones. I conform to this last use, which is not only more liberal, but also very
common in classical geometry.
to an existential proposition in this same sense of ‘existential’. Still, I also argue that Euclid does actually
endorse the view that elementary constructions aim at establishing that some objects are available within
EPG, to the effect that appropriate singular terms actually refer (and namely refer to such objects), and
the corresponding concepts are actually instantiated (and are namely instantiated by such objects). This
is, of course, perfectly compatible with (iv).
16
Adopting this terminological convention is not enough, however, to answer the natural
question that arises at this point. All the clauses of elementary constructions explicitly
stated in the Elements license construction of some objects supposing that some other
objects are given: postulate I.1 licenses construction of a segment if two points are given;
postulate I.2 licenses construction of a given segment (that is, construction of two new
segments if a segment is given); postulate I.3 licenses construction of a circle if two points
(or a segment) are given. But, if any construction requires that some objects are given
beforehand, how can one construct unconditional objects in EPG? Take again the uncon-
ditional concept of equilateral triangle. How can one construct an equilateral triangle as
such, that is, an equilateral triangle without any further specification relative to its re-
lations with some given objects? And, if it were impossible to construct unconditional
objects in EPG, how could one prove that they are available within EPG, and can then
rightfully be taken as given and provide the starting point of an elementary construction
of some other objects?
The answer goes in different stages.
The first consists in admitting that, among the clauses of elementary constructions,
there is one (left implicit by Euclid) that licenses admitting, without any previous proof,
that any (finite) number of arbitrary (i. e, not further specified), and thus unrelated seg-
ments is given. This means that an elementary construction can begin by supposing that
any (finite) number of strokes representing these segments has been freely drawn.28 Besides
this, if it has been shown that, starting with such a stand, an object of a certain sort, or a
certain system of related objects of some sorts can be constructed through an elementary
construction, another such construction can then start (for short) with the admission that
an object, a system of objects, or any (finite) number of arbitrary, and thus unrelated,
such objects or systems of objects are given, and represented by appropriate freely drawn
diagrams.29
28A particular case of this clause, involving only one arbitrary segment, is applied in the solution of
proposition I.1 expounded in footnotes (19) and (24), above. For another example, relative to an application
of this same clause involving three arbitrary segments, cf. footnote (32), below. Also the solution of
proposition I.2 that I shall mention later applies this same clause, in the case of two arbitrary segments.
Because of postulate I.1, one might alternatively admit an analogous clause in which arbitrary segments are
replaced by arbitrary points. The reason that I prefer the former admission is that definition I.3 suggests
that segments have priority over points in elementary constructions, since it implies that, if a segment is
obtained, two points are also ipso facto so, whereas a segment is not ipso facto obtained if two points are
so.
29For example, proposition I.42 of the Elements asks for the construction of a parallelogram equal to a
given triangle and having an angle equal to a given one. This construction starts, then, with the admission
that an arbitrary angle and an arbitrary triangle, unrelated to each other, are given and represented by
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If this is granted, it is enough to conventionally admit that taking something as the
starting stage of an elementary construction entails having constructed it through such
a construction, in order to infer that arbitrary segments can be constructed in EPG by
force of this very clause, and this is enough to conclude that unconditional segments are
available with EPG. According to definition I.3, this also entails that unconditional points
are so.30 This being stated, the best way to explain how other unconditional objects can
be constructed in EPG is through examples.
To begin with, take again proposition I.1 of the Elements. It asks, as said, to construct
an equilateral triangle on a given segment.31 At first glance, it seems then concerned with a
conditional concept. But this is not so. Say, for short, that each EPG object falling under
a concept P intrinsically includes one or more EPG objects falling under a concept Q if
obtaining one or more objects falling underQ is an inescapable part of obtaining each object
falling under P . Each triangle intrinsically includes three segments, for example. Hence,
proposition I.1 asks to construct an object that intrinsically includes some segments one of
which is taken to be given. As this last object is supposed to be arbitrary, the equilateral
triangle that proposition I.1 asks to construct is specified only in virtue of the requirement
that one of the objects that it intrinsically includes is an arbitrary given one. This seems
to me to be enough for concluding that this equilateral triangle is arbitrary, in turn, to the
effect that proposition I.1 asks to construct an arbitrary equilateral triangle, and is thus
concerned with an unconditional concept.
It follows that the solution of this proposition shows that an arbitrary equilateral trian-
gle can be constructed through an elementary construction, and it proves, thus, that (un-
conditional) equilateral triangles are available within EPG. This is the only way to prove
that unconditional objects other than segments and points are available within EPG. In
other terms, to prove that this is so, one has to prove that an arbitrary such object can be
constructed through an elementary construction.
I term ‘ontological’ the function that an EPG problem complies with insofar as its
solution proves that an arbitrary object falling under a certain unconditional concept can
be constructed through an elementary construction, and, thus, that objects falling under
this concept are available within EPG. Propositions I.22 and I.46 provide other examples,
since they prove that generic triangles and squares are available within EPG.32 For angles,
appropriate freely drawn diagrams.
30Cf. footnote (28), above.
31On the solution of this proposition, cf. footnotes (19) and (24), above.
32Notice that the availability of generic triangles within EPG does not immediately follow from the im-
plicit clause mentioned above about the starting point of an elementary construction. This clause licences,
indeed, admitting, without any previous proof, that three arbitrary, and thus unrelated, segments are
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things are a little bit more complicated, but it is enough to admit that the point that
in proposition I.2 is taken to be given is the extremity of a segment for concluding that
the solution of this proposition proves how to construct an angle that could be taken as
arbitrary. By solving propositions IV.11, IV.15 and IV.16, Euclid shows then, respectively,
how to inscribe, through an elementary construction, a regular pentagon, a regular hexagon
and a regular pentadecagon into a given arbitrary circle, which immediately suggests how
to construct these regular polygons on an arbitrary given segment33, and then to prove
that regular pentagons, hexagons, and pentadecagons are available within EPG.
Come back now to proposition I.1. It is easy to see that the construction involved in
its solution applies to any given segment (regardless of whether it is arbitrary or not).
Hence, this solution also proves that for any given segment, an equilateral triangle (or
better two, since, though Euclid does not remark on it explicitly, the same construction
can be replicated twice on two opposite sides of the given segment) can be constructed on
it through an elementary construction. This is a new constructive clause for elementary
constructions derived from those already stated or implicitly admitted.34 Let us term
‘constructive’ the functions that an EPG problem complies with insofar as its solution
provides such a proof.
All EPG problems comply with this function, though this is negligible in many cases.
On the contrary, the great majority of EPG problems do not comply with the ontological
one, since they are concerned with conditional concepts. Typically, EPG problems comply-
ing with the constructive function but not with the ontological one ask to construct either
conditional points, or other conditional objects which are ipso facto given or can be easily
given and represented by three strokes freely drawn. But it does not license the same for three segments
so mutually placed to form a triangle. Hence, availability of generic triangles within EPG needs to be
proved, and this is done in solving proposition I.22. The fact that this proposition occurs so late in the
Elements, and namely after generic triangles have already been considered in other propositions, could
make one to think that it involves a sort of circularity. Still, this circularity is expository, at most, since
the solution of this proposition relies only on the postulate I.3 and the solution of proposition I.2 (and
the restrictive condition involved in this same proposition could be avoided if the possibility of stating a
problem with an impossible solution in some cases were admitted).
33Suppose that a regular polygon has been inscribed into a given arbitrary circle. If an arbitrary segment
is given, construct on this segment an isosceles triangle (having the two other sides equal) similar to the
isosceles triangle formed by a side of this polygon and two radii of this circle (which can be done without
appealing to any proportion, merely by constructing appropriate parallel segments). The vertex of this
triangle opposed to the given segment is the center of another circle into which is inscribed a polygon
similar to the given one and having the given segment as side.
34Suppose that, in conducting any argument, one is considering a certain segment. Then, this new clause
licenses constructing an equilateral triangle on it (or better two) having it as a side, in the same way as,
for example, postulate I.1 licenses constructing a segment joining two given points.
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constructed though an elementary construction if such points are given.35 Hence, their
solutions prove that these conditional objects can be constructed through an elementary
construction and are thus available within EPG.36
A last remark for completeness, before turning our back on EPG. The previous consid-
erations also allow an explanation of the logical nature of theorems in EPG. These are, of
course, universal statements about EPG objects. Still, insofar as these objects do not form
a fixed domain of quantification, as explained above, it is not appropriate to understand
them as claims that all EPG object of a certain sort, taken individually, enjoy a certain
property. In my understanding, they are about objects available within EPG, and state
that any given EPG object of a certain sort enjoys a certain property, or better that, if a
given EPG object is of a certain sort, then it enjoys this property. For example, proposition
I.5 of the Elements, does not state, in my view, that all isosceles triangles have the angles
at the base equal to one another, but rather that if an isosceles triangles is given, then its
angles at the base are equal to one another (which is perfectly reflected by its proof that,
as it is well-known, is concerned by an arbitrary given isosceles triangle).
1.3. Extending Euclid’s Plane Geometry Before Descartes
Insofar as the only way to prove that EPG objects other than arbitrary segments and
points are available within EPG is by solving problems, there is no general warrant that
EPG objects be available within EPG. And, as a matter of fact, many of them, both
unconditional and conditional, are not. For example, both regular heptagons and squares
equal to given circles are EPG objects (respectively unconditional and conditional), but are
35Take proposition I.9 as an example. It asks to bisect a given angle, to the effect that its solution
requires that a new angle be constructed within the given one, and, for it to be done, that an appropriate
segment (or straight line) through the vertex of this last angle be constructed. Still, because of postulate
I.1, the construction of this segment immediately follows from the construction of an appropriate point
(which Euclid identifies with the vertex of an equilateral triangle constructed, according to the solution of
proposition I.1, on a chord of the given angle). Another example is given by proposition I.10, which asks,
instead, to bisect a given segment. Its solution requires that a new segment be constructed on the given
one. But it is quite clear that such a new segment is ipso facto given if an appropriate point is constructed
on the segment originally given.
36The proof that a conditional object can be constructed through an elementary construction starting
from the relevant given objects could be also seen as the proof that a certain arbitrary configurations of
objects can be so constructed. This does not undermine the distinction between the ontological and the
constructive functions of EPG problems, however, since the fact that some configurations of geometrical
objects are taken as genuine geometrical objects and some are not is crucial. And it is just on this fact
that this difference rests, in the very end.
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not available within EPG.37 Informally speaking, one can say that conservatively extending
EPG means accepting EPG and just licensing other ways to obtain geometrical objects than
by elementary constructions (which implies that also in the extensions of EPG that are
gotten this way, geometrical objects are not taken to exist, in the sense just explained,
but are just required to be obtained in some appropriate way). In this sense, the search
for constructions of EPG objects not available within EPG was a search for a conservative
extension of EPG. Still, some of these constructions also involved geometrical non-EPG
objects (i.e. objects that EPG does not take into account, or that are purported to fall
under concepts whose application conditions cannot be stated in the language of EPG).
The desire to study these objects was, also, a motivation for looking for such an extension.
In section 2, I shall account for the way Descartes pursues this aim. Before that, it is useful
to consider some earlier and more local efforts for solving geometrical problems through
various sorts of non-elementary constructions.
These constructions were still diagrammatic, to the effect that the identity conditions
of the objects obtained though them were also provided by appropriate diagrams. Hence,
these objects did no more form a fixed domain of quantification and individual reference,
in the sense explained in section 1.1, and to refer individually to some of them, one had
to obtain, or suppose to have obtained them by drawing diagrams. Still, some of these
objects were defined by describing their construction, to the effect that their definition
already provided a warrant for their availability.
The admission of non-elementary constructions also made it possible to state two sorts
of non-EPG problems. The former includes problems that, like EPG ones, ask to construct
EPG objects, but, unlike them, do not require that to be done through an elementary
construction. I call them ‘quasi-EPG problems’. The latter includes problems asking for the
construction of some non-EPG objects, like curves other than circles (such as in Pappus’
problem: Pappus (CMH), II, 676-68; Pappus (C7SJ), I, 118-123), or conditional EPG
objects which are required to stay in some appropriate relations with some given non-EPG
objects (such as in the problem of tangents to conics). I call them ‘strictly non-EPG
problems’.
For my present purpose, I only need to concentrate on quasi-EPG problems. Any EPG
problem is of course easily convertible to a quasi-EPG problem by merely omitting the
requirement that the objects be constructed through an elementary construction. Rele-
vant quasi-EPG problems however, include only those that are either non solvable through
37The claim that some EPG objects are not available within EPG could appear to be strange. However,
it seems to me a quite natural way of rendering the hiatus that there is in EPG between definitions and
constructions, which is often rendered (wrongly I think) by saying that defining objects in EPG is not
enough for warranting for their existence.
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an elementary construction, or at least withstood a solution through an elementary con-
struction in classical geometry though actually admitting such a solution (a well-known
example is the problem of constructing a regular heptadecagon on a given segment, which
was famously proved to be solvable through an elementary construction only by Gauss:
Zimmermann (1796); Gauss (1801), sect. VII).
I also suggest distinguishing two sorts of non-elementary constructions that, in classi-
cal geometry, entered into the solution of those problems. The former rely only on EPG
objects, though applying constructive clauses not included among those of elementary con-
structions; the latter rely instead on some non-EPG objects, namely curves other than
circles. Hence, whereas the former include only constructions of EPG objects, the latter
include constructions of such curves. I call the former ‘quasi-elementary constructions’ and
the latter ‘strictly non-elementary constructions’. Quasi-EPG problems are possibly solv-
able either through the former or the latter. Strictly non-EPG ones are possibly solvable,
instead, only through the latter.
Admitting quasi-elementary constructions is the same as extending EPG exactness
norms. An aspect of the exactness concern for early modern geometry was relative to such
a sort of extension, and was thus specifically related to quasi-elementary constructions.
Another aspect of this concern was specifically related, instead, to strictly non-elementary
constructions and was relative to the admission of appropriate exactness norms relative to
curves other than circles.
The distinction between quasi-elementary and strictly non-elementary constructions is
still not enough for accounting for the variety of constructions that populated classical ge-
ometry. For each one of these two sorts of constructions, finer distinctions are possible and
necessary. For many problems of classical geometry, especially for quasi-EPG ones, differ-
ent solutions involving different sorts of constructions were known, indeed. The preference
for one of them over others, or the search for new solutions, essentially different from those
already known, were symptoms of different attitudes towards the exactness concern. In
the first part of 17th century, many of these attitudes cohabited, being often only locally
motivated, or not motivated at all. When Descartes came to geometry, he faced such a
plurality of attitudes. Hence, his views on this topic could and should be understood as
reactions to this quite confused state of affairs.
It is not easy, however, to make the relevant distinctions clear without going through
appropriate examples. The purpose of the following sections 1.3.1, 1.3.2, and 1.3.3 is to offer
these examples by considering different solutions of three classical quasi-EPG problems:
the angle trisection, the two mean proportionals, and the circle squaring ones.38
38These are also the problems Serfati refers to in order to describe the historical context of Descartes’
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1.3.1. Trisecting an Angle
Let us begin with Vie`te’s solution of the first of these problems (Vie`te (1593), prop. IX;
Vie`te (AAKW), 398; Bos (2001), 167-173). Let ÊBD (fig. 1) be the angle to be trisected
(Vie`te’s construction applies regardless of whether it is acute, right or obtuse). Trace the
circle with radius BE and centre B, and the straight line FE such that FG = BE. If BH is
the parallel to FE through B, then ĤBD is the third part of ÊBD. The proof is easy by
considering the internal angles of the isosceles triangles FBG and GBE.
The straight line FE, i.e. the points G or F, cannot be obtained through an elementary
construction. To license their construction, Vie`te appeals to a new “postulate”, apt “to
supply the deficiency of geometry”. This is the neusis postulate which licenses one “to
draw a straight line from any point to any two [given] lines, so that the intercept between
them be any possible determined segment” (I slightly modify Bos’ translation: Bos (2001),
168; this significantly differs in turn from Witmer’s: Vie`te (AAKW), 388).39 The previous
construction applies this postulate in the case where one of the two given lines is straight
and the other a is circle.
This construction results from a slight modification of that offered by Pappus in his
Mathematical Collection (Pappus (CMH), I, 271-277; Heath (1961), I, 235-237; Knorr
(1989) , 213-216; Bos (2001), 53-56), which requires, instead, cutting off a segment equal
to a given one between two straight lines.40 Pappus does not appeal to any new postulate,
however. He rather shows how to obtain a neusis by intersection of a circle and a hyperbola.
Let it be requested to trace a straight line through E (fig. 3) cutting off a segment equal to
a between HK and IJ. Let EA and EC be respectively the parallels to HK and IJ through E.
Trace the circle of centre A and radius AL equal to a, and the hyperbola through A with
asymptotes HK and EC. Let D be the intersection point of this circle and this hyperbola.
The parallel EG to AD through E is such that GF = a. To prove it, it is enough to remark
that any point D∗ on the circle is such that G∗F∗ = a, if D∗F∗ and G∗F∗ are respectively
parallel to IJ and AD∗, and any point D
◦
on the hyperbola is such that G
◦
F
◦
passes through
E, if D
◦
F
◦
and G
◦
F
◦
are respectively parallel to IJ and AD
◦
.
A hyperbola is univocally determined if its asymptotes and a point through which it
passes are given. Hence, Pappus’s solution requires admitting that an hyperbola is ipso
reflections on geometrical exactness: Serfati (1993), 198-204.
39For the meaning of the adjective ‘possible [possibili ]’, cf. Bos (2001), 168, footnote 4.
40Let D̂BE (fig. 2) the angle to be trisected (which is supposed to be acute; if the given angle is obtuse, an
analogous construction provides a trisection of its supplement). Trace EF and FL respectively perpendicular
and parallel to BE. Trace BH such that GH = 2BF. ĤBE is the third part of D̂BE. Supposing that M is
the middle point of GH, the proof involves the isosceles triangles HFM and FBM.
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facto obtained—so that intersection points of it and some other given lines are obtained
in turn—if it is univocally determined. In classical geometry this was usual for any conic.
Commandinus’s Latin translation of Pappus’s Collection (Pappus (CMC)) appeared five
years before Vie`te published his solution. It is thus likely that Vie`te preferred constructions
based on his new postulate over ones depending on this admission with a full knowledge
of the facts. It is not easy to say why, but some guesses are possible.
To justify his postulate, Vie`te remarks that Nicomedes “seems to have performed”
constructions that Vie`te’s postulate would license by relying on appropriate conchoids of
straight lines and circles.41 Conchoids of straight lines are defined by Pappus (Pappus
(CMH), I, 242-245) as trajectories of a point P (fig. 4.1) moving on a straight half-line OP
so that MP remains constant while this line rotates around a fixed point O cutting a fixed
straight line MM.42 This foreshadows the possibility of tracing this curve through a simple
instrument composed by three rulers replacing OP, MM, and MP. An analogous instrument
can be used to trace conchoids of circles. For future reference, call these instruments
‘conchoid compasses’.
Like regular compasses and other similar instruments, they can be used in two ways:
either in the tracing way, i.e. by making them trace a curve; or in the pointing way,
i.e. by making them indicate some points (which are then taken to be obtained) under the
condition that some of their elements coincide with some given geometrical objects, or meet
some other conditions relative to given objects.43 If an instrument is used in the former way,
once a curve is traced, it can be put away, and this curve taken as constructed. If it is used
in the latter way, the sought after points can only be indicated by appropriate elements of
41Vie`te also appeals to Archimedes, who, in proving propositions 5-9 of his treatise On spirals, admits
constructions based on neusis: Heath (1897), C-CXXII.
42This is only the external branch of a conchoid, in fact. To have the entire conchoid, including an
external and an internal branch (fig. 4.2), one has to take the point P to be on the entire straight line OP
and, so to say, to change sides with respect to O and M while passing through the infinite. Alternatively,
one can take the entire conchoid to be formed by the trajectories of two points P and Q placed on the
straight half-line OP at equal distance from M, on the two sides of it. To have a conchoid of a circle, it is
enough to replace the straight line MM with a circle (fig. 4.3). For short, in what follows, I shall use the
term ‘conchoid’ to refer only to the external branch of a conchoid of a straight line.
43To illustrate the use of conchoid compasses in the pointing way, consider Pappus’s construction related
in footnote (40), above. After having traced EF and FL (fig. 5.1), one can make use of a conchoid compass
whose pole O is brought to coincide with the vertex B of the angle D̂BE and is to a distance equal to BE
from the ruler HK, so that this last ruler coincides, in turn, with EF. If the ruler XY, sliding on the other
ruler OW, is equal to the double of BF, it is enough to rotate OW around O until Y comes to be on FL, for
OW be in the position that the segment BH has to take for GH to be equal to 2BF, as required. The same
compass is used in the tracing way if it is so used that, while OW (fig. 5.2) rotates around O, Y traces the
conchoid IJ whose intersection with FL provides the point H.
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it. To construct these points, one has to transpose this indication on the support where the
construction is done through appropriate dots or other diagrammatic marks. This suggests
two different sorts of constructive clauses, licensing respectively obtaining curves by tracing
them through instruments, and obtaining points by using instruments in the pointing way.
The former necessarily pertains to strictly non-elementary constructions; the latter can
pertain either to strictly non-elementary constructions or to quasi-elementary ones.
Vie`te’s postulate avoids instead any appeal to instruments: it appears as a way to license
neusis within quasi-elementary constructions without using instruments in the pointing
way. Vie`te advances no explicit reason for preferring this attitude. One can guess that he
was pursuing both ontological parsimony and argumentative purity, trying to avoid both
curves other than circles (including conics) and instruments used in the pointing way.
1.3.2. Finding two mean proportionals
Vie`te’s postulate was new, but the purpose of solving quasi-EPG problems through quasi-
elementary constructions was not. Still, in classical geometry, it was customary to use
instruments in the pointing way for this purpose. This attitude is illustrated by Eratos-
thenes’s solution to the two mean proportionals problem. This is related by Pappus (Pap-
pus (CMH), I, 56-59; Knorr (1986), 211; Knorr (1989), 64-65) and opposed to Menaech-
mus’s (Archimedes (OOTH), III, 82-85; Heath (1961), I, 251-255; Knorr (1986), 61-66;
Knorr (1989), 94-100; Bos (2001), 38-40), which is famously based, instead, on a strictly
non-elementary construction involving the intersection of conics, and on the admission that
a conic is ipso facto obtained if it is univocally determined.
The former goes as follows. Let a and b be two given segments (a < b). Let also ABCD,
LMNO, and WXYZ (fig. 6.1) be three equal rectangular plates of height equal to b (their
length is irrelevant). On each of them trace a diagonal, and mark on AD a length AH equal
to a. Slide LMNO beneath WXYZ (fig. 6.2) so that LN cuts WZ in some point Q. Trace QY
and produce it up to cut AC in K, AD in H′, and AX produced in E. Slide ABCD beneath
LMNO (fig. 6.3) until K falls on LO. If H′ coincides with H, stop the procedure. Otherwise,
slide LMNO and AMCD (fig. 6.4) again until this happens. The two mean proportionals
between a and b are equal to LK and WQ, respectively. The proof is obvious by similarity
of triangles.
One could imagine replacing the plates with genuine geometrical rectangles. But this
would make no relevant difference, since the diagrams representing these rectangles should
then be supposed to move until they reach a position that satisfies a coincidence condition
relative to other diagrams representing some given geometrical objects. This would be a
use of diagrams essentially different from that involved in elementary or in other sorts
of non-elementary constructions, where coincidences are not acknowledged by inspecting
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moving diagrams but imposed on fixed diagrams by drawing them44.
A simplification of Eratosthenes’s construction was suggested by Clavius (Clavius (1589),
33; Bos (2001), 72-75). Let AB (fig. 8.1) be equal to b, and C be a point on it such that
AC = a. Trace the semicircle of diameter AB and its chord AK through any point K on it.
Let CD and LK both be perpendicular to AB, and M be the intersection point of CD and
AK (possibly extended). Let K∗, L∗ and M∗ be the respective positions of K, L and M such
that AM∗ = AL∗. The sought after mean proportionals are equal to AM∗ and AK∗. The
proof is immediate by the similarity of triangles ACM∗, AL∗K∗, and ABK∗.
Clavius admits that points K∗, L∗ and M∗ are obtained without saying how they are.
They could be obtained by using an appropriate instrument in the pointing way. Let AP
and AQ (fig. 8.2) be two rulers, the former of which is fixed and the latter of which rotates
around A. Attach to them three other rulers, CD and LK, both perpendicular to AP, and
BK perpendicular to AQ, so that: C is fixed on both AP and CD; M slides on both CD and
AQ; L is fixed on LK and slides on AP; K is fixed on BK and slides on both LK and AQ;
B slides on both AP and BK. If AC = a, and the instrument is so adjusted that AB = b
and AM = AL, the sought after mean proportionals are equal to AM and AK. For ensuring
that AC = a and AB = b, it is enough to evaluate whether A, B, and C coincide with the
extremities of two given segments. But AM and AL cannot be superposed, and the only
way to construct two equal segments that they have to coincide with is by solving the two
mean proportionals problem itself. Hence, for ensuring that AM = AL, while using this
instrument in solving the problem, one has to measure them, for example by graduating
AP and AQ, or by equipping the instrument with a graduated disc centred on A. Using
such an instrument in the pointing way requires then something essentially different from
that which is required for using a conchoid compass this way.
If B is kept fixed on AP, this instrument can only trace a semicircle. But, if B is left
to slide on AP, while AQ rotates, K describes different curves depending on the relation
of the motion of B on AP and the rotation of AQ. If these motions are linked through a
ruler passing through L and attached perpendicularly to AQ at a fixed point K0 (fig. 8.3),
44Eratosthenes’s instrument could also be used in the tracing way, but then the curves traced by it
should then be supposed to move until they reach a position that meets a coincidence condition. The
resulting construction is thus more complicated than both Menaechmus’s and Eratosthenes’s and presents
no advantages over them. This is how one could reason. While the plates slide, the intersection point G∗
of AC and HY (fig. 7) describes an arc of a hyperbola which is fixed under the variation of the distance
LW. If this distance varies while AL remains fixed, the intersection point G
◦
of AC and YQ describes
another arc of a hyperbola whose position depends on AL. Let K∗ be the intersection point of these two
hyperbolas. Trace K∗Y intersecting WZ at Q∗. Trace Q∗L∗ parallel to AC, and L∗K
◦
perpendicular to AX.
The positions of points K and K
◦
vary with AL. When they come to coincide, Q and Q∗ do also. This is
the final configuration: the sought after mean proportionals are equal to LK and WQ, respectively.
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K traces a curve that could enter into a strictly non-elementary construction solving the
problem. By adding other rulers alternatively perpendicular to AP and AQ one gets, then,
more complex compasses famously mentioned in Descartes’ Ge´ome´trie. I come back to
them in section 2.1.
Another solution based on a different strictly non-elementary construction is related by
J. B. Villalpando, though possibly due to C. Grienberger (Prado and Villalpando (1596-
1604), III, 289-290; Bos (2001), 75-77). Let BO and AO (fig. 9.1) be two given segments
such that BO = 2AO. Trace the semicircles with them as diameters. Let C be an arbitrary
point on the former. Trace the chord OC cutting the latter at D. Take E and G on BO and
F on OC so that OD = EO = EF. Through F, trace GF perpendicular to BO. Let BFO be
the locus of F generated by C moving on the semicircle BCO. Let PO = b form any angle
with BO and let Q be taken on it, R on BO, and S on BFO so that QO = a, QR be parallel
to PB, and RS be perpendicular to BO. Through O and S, trace the chord OT. Take U and
V on BO, and W and Y on PO so that UO = OS, VO = OT, and WU and YV are parallels
to PB. The sought after mean proportionals are equal to WO and YO. To prove it, trace
EH perpendicular to OC and remark that OC = 2OD and OF = 2OH, to the effect that
OH : EO = OF : OC, and GO : OF = OF : OC = OC : BO. As S is on the locus, also
the proportions RO : OS = OS : OT = OT : BO hold, and UO and VO are thus two mean
proportionals between RO and BO.
The problem of finding two mean proportionals between two given segments a and b
can be reduced to that of finding two mean proportionals between another given segment
β and the fourth proportional α between b, a and β. Indeed, if ξ and κ are two mean
proportionals between α and β and α : a = ξ : x = κ : y, then x and y are two mean
proportionals between a and b. By exploiting this fact, Villalpando shows how to solve the
problem by relying on a locus like BFO relative to any arbitrary given semicircle, whatever
the two given segments a and b might be.45 It is the locus of a point (F) obtained through
an elementary construction based on the supposition that its generating point (C) is given
in an arbitrary position. Villalpando’s solution can thus be accepted only if it is admitted
that a locus of a point is ipso facto obtained if this point is obtained through an admissible
construction based on the supposition that the generating point of this same locus is given
in an arbitrary position. This is the paradigmatic case of what Bos calls ‘generic point-wise
constructions’ (Bos (2001), 343).
But Villalpando’s locus can also be traced using an appropriate instrument. Let IJ
45This locus is a branch of a sextic of equation
(
x2 + y2
)3 = b2x4, with respect to orthogonal co-ordinates
of origin O and axis OX, with b = BO (Bos (2001), 76; footnote 33). The whole sextic forms a figure-of-eight
including four similar symmetric branches with a common vertical tangent at O.
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(fig. 9.2) be a ruler longer than 2b, O its middle point, and B another point on it such
that BO = b. Let IM and JM be two rulers forming a right angle at M. Let OM and BC
be two other rulers also forming a right angle at their intersection point C, and LN and
LF be two further rulers, the former perpendicular to JM and passing through C, and the
latter perpendicular to OM and passing through L. While IM and JM rotate, M traces
the semicircle IMJ, C the semicircle BCO, and F Villalpando’s locus. The proof is easy.
Let A be the middle point of BO, AD the perpendicular to OM through A, and EK the
perpendicular to JM though D. While IM and JM rotate, this last point traces the semicircle
ADO, and the equalities OD = EO = EF are obtained (to prove that EO = EF, remark that
LF and FO are perpendicular to each other and E is the middle point of OL, since D is the
middle point of OC). The problem can thus be solved through a strictly non-elementary
construction involving the curve traced by such an instrument, that, for future reference,
I call ‘Villalpando’s compass’.
1.3.3. Squaring a Circle
The availability of such a simple instrument for tracing Villalpando’s locus depends on
its being a locus of a point constructed through an elementary construction starting from
the supposition that the generating point of this locus is given in an arbitrary position
(on a given semicircle on which it is supposed to move). This ensures that any number of
arbitrary points of this curve can be constructed through the same elementary construction.
This case is different from that of curves, any number of specific points of which can be
so constructed. A well-known example is the quadratrix, famously introduced by Hippias
(Heath (1961), I, 225-230), and defined by Pappus (Pappus (CMH), I, 252-253; Knorr
(1986), 82; Bos (2001) , 40-42) as the trajectory CFG (fig. 10.1) of the intersection point
F of two equal segments OP and MN, the former of which turns clockwise and uniformly
around O starting from position OC, while the latter goes uniformly down along CO, keeping
parallel to its starting position CB, these motions being so related that the two segments
come together to their final position OA.46
A way to construct any number of specific points of a quadratrix through an elementary
construction is suggested by Clavius (Clavius (1589), I, 894-918, esp. 896-896; Mancosu
(1996), 74-76; Bos (2001), 160-166). One begins by constructing the intersection point F1,1
(fig. 10.2) of the bisector OF1,1 of the right angle ĈOA and the perpendicular M1,1F1,1 to OC
46If segments OP and MN are replaced by two half straight lines OQ and MT moving indefinitely in
the same way, their intersection point traces an infinity of infinite branches with asymptotes parallel to
OA. The central branch is symmetric with respect to OA and its asymptotes are at a distance equal to
2OC from this straight line. The other branches are symmetric with respect to OR and its asymptotes are
symmetric to each other at a distance equal to 2OC.
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through its middle point M1,1. Then one continues in the same way, by constructing the
intersection points F2,1 and F2,2 of the bisectors OF2,1 and OF2,2 of the angles ĈOF1,1 and
F̂1,1OA and the perpendiculars M2,1F2,1 and M2,2F2,2 to OC through the middle points M2,1
and M2,2 of M1,1C and OM1,1, respectively. By reiterating this construction, one constructs
as many points F1,1, F2,1, F2,2, F3,1, F3,2, F3,3, F3,4, &c. as one wants, all belonging to the
quadratrix.
Though these points are specific, for Clavius their construction provides a “geometrical
description” of the corresponding quadratrix which is enough, according to him, for ob-
taining such a curve if OC is given. If this is admitted, or it is admitted that a quadratrix
is obtained in some way, then it is easy to rely on it for dividing any given angle according
to any rational ratio (Pappus (CMH), I, 284-287; Knorr (1986), 84; Bos (2001), 43-44).
Since P̂OA (fig. 10.1) is to a right angle as OM is to OC, for any ratio ρ smaller than 1,
any given angle R̂ST (fig. 10.3), and any quadratrix UVX of horizontal axis ST, if WV is
the perpendicular to ST through the intersection point V of this quadratrix and the side
RS of this angle, it is cut at Y so that WY is to WV in the ratio ρ, and YZ is parallel to
ST, then ẐST is to R̂ST in this same ratio.
But quadratrices also famously have another property: the point G at which they cut
their horizontal axis (fig. 10.1) is such that OC is mean proportional between the arc CPA
and OG. This is proved by Pappus by reductio ad absurdum (Pappus (CMH), I, 256-259),
and makes it possible to rely on a quadratrix to solve the circle squaring problem through
a strictly non-elementary construction. Let CPA (fig. 10.4) be any given arc of a quarter
circle, and CFG the corresponding quadratrix. If GC and CH are mutually perpendicular,
OH is equal to the arc CPA. Hence, if B is the middle point of OC, the rectangle HOBK is
equal to the quarter circle CPAO.
If the quadratrix is supposed to be obtained by tracing it as Pappus suggests, this
solution is open to Sporus’s objections (Pappus (CMH), I, 252-257). They are two. The
former makes a statement of circularity: the constant speeds of the motions of OP and MN
(fig. 10 .1) cannot be fixed if the circle of radius OC has not had been rectified beforehand.
The latter makes a statement of inaccuracy: the point G is not an intersection point, since
OP and MN do not intersect in their common final position OA.
As observed by Bos (Bos (2001), 42-43, footnote 15), the former objection can be
overcome by modifying Pappus’ definition. It is enough to identify a quadratrix as the
trajectory of the intersection point F of two straight half-lines OQ and MT that move
uniformly with any arbitrary speed in opposite directions from those in which the segments
OP and MN are supposed to move according to this definition: both starting from position
OS, the former rotating counter-clockwise and the later going from bottom to top. The
segment OC does not thus have to be given beforehand, and point C is rather obtained
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as the intersection point of such a quadratrix and the perpendicular to OS through O.
Once this point is obtained, the circle of radius OC can be squared by relying on this
quadratrix, and, once this circle is squared, any other circle can be so by constructing a
fourth proportional.
The latter objection cannot be equally overcome however, since it applies however a
quadratrix is obtained. It can no more be overcome by appealing to Clavius’s previous
argument, despite Clavius’s own allegation. It is not only obvious, indeed, that G is not
one of the points F1,1, F2,1, &c. It is also clear that if a quadratrix is obtained as Clavius
suggests, any other point of it that is not one of these points is in the same situation as
G. Hence, far from replying to Sporus’s latter objection, Clavius merely disregards it, by
frankly admitting that a curve can be obtained by interpolation, as it is said in modern
parlance.
1.3.4. Six sorts of non-elementary constructions
The previous examples present six different sorts of non-elementary constructions.47
There are, firstly, two sorts of quasi-elementary constructions. The former are those
that appeal to instruments used in the pointing way. The latter are those that rely on
some explicit stipulations or tacit admissions working as constructive clauses, like Vie`te’s
postulate, or Clavius admission that the points K∗, L∗ and M∗ (fig. 8.1) are ipso facto
obtained.
There are then four sorts of strictly non-elementary constructions differing from each
other in the way the relevant curves are obtained. Some involve conics supposed to be ipso
facto obtained if univocally determined. Others involve curves traced by instruments used
in the tracing way, or at least described as trajectories of motions reproducible through
appropriate such instruments. Others again involve curves obtained through generic point-
wise constructions. Finally, some involve curves obtained by interpolation.
2. Descartes’ Exactness
EPG is often described as dealing with ideal and immutable self-standing objects or forms,
which we can only inaccurately depict.48 If EPG were so understood, the use of instruments
in geometry (both in the pointing and in the tracing way), and more generally the appeal
47My classification does not coincide with Bos’ (Bos (2001), 61) and is motivated by different arguments
and distinctions.
48This account is often taken to be a Platonic one. Still, though inspired by Proclus’ neo-Platonic
interpretation of EPG (Proclus (CITF); Proclus (CIPM)), it contrasts with some recent understandings
of Plato’s conception of geometry, like Burnyeat’s (Burnyeat (1987)).
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to motion, should be considered as entirely extraneous to its spirit, unless they were merely
seen as tricks for achieving convenient depictions of ideal forms. The situation is different
if it is granted that EPG objects are obtained through diagrammatic constructions. Since
it then becomes natural to consider the admission of new procedures for drawing diagrams,
also by using instruments, as a proper way for conservatively extending EPG.
In classical geometry, the use of instruments to obtain geometrical objects did not go
together with fixing precise conditions that such a use of an instrument had to submit
to. As a matter of fact, this made the exactness norms of geometric objects inaccurate
and contributed highly to the fluidity of classical geometry. More generally, this fluidity
depended on the fact that different sorts of non-elementary constructions were either ad-
mitted or rejected by appealing to different sorts of arguments, or even without relying on
any precise argument.
Different opinions have been advanced on the evolution of Descartes’ views on geometry:
some insisting on the occurrence of essential changes, other on a substantial continuity of
thinking. I cannot discuss these opinions here. I merely advance that, at least on one basic
point, Descartes’ views did not change from his youth until the Ge´ome´trie. He always
aimed to overcome a situation like that just described, by imposing some global principles
motivating an all-embracing attitude concerning constructions. A detailed account of the
different ways in which he pursued this aim in different periods of his life is outside the
scope of the present paper. I shall limit myself to the Ge´ome´trie, by showing that these
principles, though based on a general standard of conceivability, remained faithful in spirit
to EPG restrictions.
2.1. Descartes on the Mean Proportionals Problem
A convenient way to approach the matter is by considering what Descartes says about
the mean proportionals problems at the beginning of the third book (Descartes (1637),
369-371; Descartes (AT) , VI, 442-444; Bos (2001), 239-242). As he famously refers to an
instrument introduced in the second book (Descartes (1637), 317-319; Descartes (AT), VI,
391-392), which I have already mentioned in section 1.3.2, some remarks on this instrument
are necessary first. It is usually called ‘mesolabum’ or ‘proportions compass’. I prefer the
latter name, since the former also sometimes denotes Eratosthenes’s instrument described
in this same section or others inspired by it (Bos (2001), 35-36, 48, 72).
Consider the instrument represented in figure 8.3. For further convenience, change the
names of points L, K and B and call them ‘L1’, K1’ and ‘L2’, respectively (fig. 11.1). Then
complete it by extending the pattern K0L1K1L2 beyond L2: attach to Li (i = 2, 3, . . .) the
rulers LiKi perpendicular to AP, and to Ki the rulers Li+1Ki perpendicular to AQ. Keep K0
fixed on both AQ and L1K0, while the points Li (i = 1, 2, . . .) slide on the rulers AP and
LiKi−1 and remain fixed on the rulers LiKi, and the points Ki slide on the rulers AQ and Li
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Ki and remain fixed on the rulers Li+1Ki. The triangles Ki−1ALi and KiALi are similar to
each other. Hence: AKi−1 : ALi = ALi : AKi = AKi : ALi+1. If AK0 = a, it follows that: i)
if the compass is so arranged that AKi = b, then segments respectively equal to AL1, AK1,
AL2 ,. . . , AKi−1, ALi are the 2i− 1 mean proportionals between a and b; ii) if the compass
is so arranged that ALi+1 = b, then segments respectively equal to AL1, AK1, AL2,. . . , ALi,
AKi are the 2i mean proportionals between a and b.
This makes it obvious how to use proportions compasses in the pointing way to solve
mean proportionals problems. Still, Descartes does not suggest using them this way. He
rather shows how to rely on the curves EKi traced by points Ki while AQ rotates around A,
for constructing any even number of mean proportionals. Let it be required to construct 2µ
mean proportionals between a and b (for some positive integer µ, and suppose that a < b).
Descartes’ construction goes as follows. Let ae (fig. 11.2) be equal to a. Produce it up to
l′ so that al′ = b. Trace the circle with diameter al′, and apply to e the curve traced by
the point Kµ of a proportions compass with AK0 = a, in such a way that e coincides with
its origin marked by point E on the compass. Let k′ be the intersection point of this circle
and this curve. Join a and k′ and, with centre a, trace the circle of radius ae cutting ak′
at k. Trace lk perpendicular to ak′. Then, al and ak′ are respectively equal to the smallest
and the greatest of the 2µ sought after mean proportionals. If µ > 1, the other 2µ− 2 can
be constructed as fourth proportionals.
Though Descartes does not note it, an analogous construction allows the construction
of any odd number of mean proportionals. It goes as follows. Let it be required to find
2µ− 1 mean proportionals between two given segments a and b (for some integer µ greater
than 1, and suppose that a < b). Supposing that ae and ag (fig. 11.3) are two segments with
a common extremity which are respectively equal to a and b, one can proceed as follows
(regardless of the angle ĝae). Apply to e the curve traced by the point Kµ of a proportions
compass with AK0 = a, in such a way that e coincides with its origin. With centre a, trace
a circle of radius ag cutting this curve at k′. Join a to k′ and, with centre a, trace the circle
of radius ae cutting ak′ at k. Produce ae and trace lk and l′k′, respectively perpendicular
to ak′ and al′. Then, al and al′ are respectively equal to the smallest and the greatest of
the 2µ−1 sought after mean proportionals. The other 2µ−3 can be constructed as fourth
proportionals.
One understands why, for Descartes, there is neither an “easier” way to solve the mean
proportionals problems nor a “more evident” proof that their solution is sound (Descartes
(1637), 370; Descartes (AT), VI, 442-443). But this is not all, since, despite this, he
famously adds that “it would be a mistake in geometry” to apply this solution for finding
two, four or six mean proportionals, since, “for the construction of any problem [. . . ][,]
we should choose with care the simplest [curve]”, and these mean proportionals can be
found through curves of a “simpler genus” than those traced by proportions compasses
32
(Descartes (1637), 369-371; Descartes (AT), VI, 442-444; Bos (2001), 357-359).49 Descartes
is generalising Pappus’s simplicity precept here (Pappus (CMH), I, 270-273; Bos (2001),
48-50), and—by assuming that any curve to be admitted in geometry is expressed by a
two-variable polynomial equation—he measures the simplicity of these curves through the
degree of their equations. Let us see how his precept applies to the present case.
If referred to orthogonal lineal co-ordinates whose origin and axis coincide respectively
with the pole A and the ruler AP of a proportions compass with AK0 = AE = a, the curves
traced by the points Ki (i = 1, 2, . . .) of this compass have equation x
4i = a2 (x2 + y2)
2i−1
.
The solution of the two mean proportionals problem provided by the former of the two
previous constructions relies then on a quadric, whereas Menaechmus’s solution (references
are given in section 1.3.2) relies on two conics.
Something similar happens for the four and six mean proportionals problems. At the
end of the Ge´ome´trie (Descartes (1637), 411-412; Descartes (AT), VI, 483-484; Bos (2001),
368-372), Descartes shows how to solve the former by relying on a circle and a cubic—the
so called Cartesian parabola, introduced in the second book (Descartes (1637), 309, 322,
337, 343; Descartes (AT), VI, 381-382, 395, 408-409, 415)—, whereas the solution provided
by the former of the two previous constructions relies on a curve of degree 8. He does not
show how to solve the latter problem by relying on curves simpler than the curve of degree
12 involved in the the former of the two previous constructions, but he seems to think that
his solution of the former can be generalised.
This is a quite difficult matter. Fortunately, we do not need to enter into it, since
two things are immediately clear: i) for any positive integer µ, the 2µ mean proportionals
problem can be solved by relying on two curves of equations yxµ = aµ and aµby = xµ+1,
respectively; ii) if h, p and q are three positive integers such that h = pq, the h− 1 mean
proportionals problem can be reduced to the p− 1 and q − 1 mean proportionals ones.50
From (ii), it follows that, for any positive integer µ, the 2µ − 1 mean proportionals
problem can be reduced to the single mean proportional and the µ− 1 mean proportionals
ones, and then, by reiteration, either to the single mean proportional problem alone, or
49The translation of quotations from the Ge´ome´trie are mine, but are based either on Smith and
Latham’s translation (Descartes (GDSL)), or on Bos’ or others’ translations offered in the secondary
sources I refer to.
50This is easy to explain. Let a and b be the two given segments and suppose a < b. If x is the smallest
of p − 1 mean proportionals between them, the smallest of q − 1 mean proportionals between a and x, is
also the smallest of h − 1 mean proportionals between a and b. The reason is obvious: if the p − 1 mean
proportionals between a and b are x, y, . . . , w (x < y < . . . < w), by introducing q − 1 mean proportionals
between a and x, other q − 1 ones between x and y, ..., and finally other q − 1 ones between w and b, one
gets (q − 1) p+ p− 1 = pq − 1 = h− 1 mean proportionals between a and b.
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to the single mean proportional and the 2ν mean proportionals problems, for some ν such
that 2ν < 2µ− 1. Jointly with (i), this entails that, whatever the positive integer n might
be, solving the n mean proportionals problem by relying on a curve traced by a proportions
compass does not comply with Descartes’ simplicity precept51.
Two distinct criteria are then opposed to each other concerning the choice of the appro-
priate solution for the mean proportionals problems: one of easiness, another of simplicity.
The former prescribes solving these problems by relying on curves traced by proportions
compasses, which are easy to conceive and use; the latter prescribes relying on curves of the
lower possible degree, that (a few particular cases aside) are quite difficult to determine.
According Descartes, to chose the former solution is a “mistake”. But then, why does he
mention twice the proportions compass in the Ge´ome´trie? The answer is that this mistake
is one “in geometry”: by choosing the former solution, one makes a mistake, but still ap-
peals to constructions and curves that should be admitted in geometry. Hence, the easiness
of such a solution can be exploited both for illustrating the exactness norms relative to
such curves52, and for showing that meeting these norms does not assure simplicity. The
former point is made in book II, the latter in book III. For my present purpose, only the
former is relevant.53
2.2. Ruler, Compass, and Reiteration
More precisely, Descartes makes this point immediately after the discussion of Pappus’
classification of geometrical problems into “plane”, “solid” and “line-like” ones, according
whether their solution respectively requires only straight lines (or segments) and circles,
also requires conics, or needs, as Descartes says, “more composed lines”, or, in Pappus’
51The reason is evident. Suppose that n is even, that is, n = 2µ, for some positive integer µ. Then, the
curve traced by a proportions compass that enters into the solution of the n mean proportionals problem
has equation x4µ = a2
(
x2 + y2
)2µ−1 and is then a curve of degree 4µ = 2n. On the other hand, from (i)
it follows that this same problem can also be solved by appealing to two curves of degree µ + 1 = n+22 .
Better, if n + 1 is not prime, from (ii) it also follows that this problem can be reduced to the p − 1 and
q − 1 mean proportionals ones, where p and q are such that pq = n + 1. Suppose, instead that n is odd,
that is, n = 2µ− 1 (for some positive integer µ). The curve traced by a proportions compass that enters
into the solution of the n mean proportionals problem has equation x4µ = a2
(
x2 + y2
)2µ−1 again, and is
then a curve of degree 4µ = 2 (n+ 1). On the other hand, from (ii) it follows that this same problem can
be reduced to the single mean proportional and the µ − 1 = n−12 ones. If this last number is odd, the
reduction can continues in the same way. If it is even, then, from (i) it follows that the problems can be
solved by appealing to two curves of degree n+34 .
52For Serfati (Serfati (1993), 219-220), the curves traced by proportions compasses are “exemplars” of
those that Descartes admits in geometry.
53Among the large literature concerning the latter point, let me point out the recent contribution of
Lu¨tzen: Lu¨tzen (2010).
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parlance, “lines having a varied and more convoluted origin” (Descartes (1637), 315-317;
Descartes (AT), VI, 388-390; Pappus (CMH), I, 270-271; Bos (2001), 37-48). During this
discussion Descartes remarks that among line-like problems there are some that can be
solved by relying on curves which share an essential feature with straight lines, circles
and conics. Hence, the appropriate classification is not Pappus’, but a more complex
one concerned with curves, rather than with problems: one should first distinguish those
curves that share this feature from those that do not, then classify the former. Whereas
geometricity requires using only the former, simplicity requires using, among them, those of
the lower genus. Descartes also criticises the “ancients” for having termed ‘mechanical’ any
curve other than circles and conics. He argues that this denomination cannot be justified by
advancing that “some sort of mechanical instruments [machines ] has to be used to describe
them”, since circles and straight lines also “cannot be described on paper without the use
of a compass and a ruler, which may also be termed ‘mechanical instruments’ ” (Descartes
(1637), 315; Descartes (AT), VI, 388).
Insofar as Descartes seems to take for granted that rulers and compasses have to be
used in accordance with the clauses of elementary constructions, his point seems to be that
obtaining circles and straight lines (or better, segments) requires elementary constructions.
This is obviously not the same as arguing that elementary constructions are enough for
constructing all circles and straight lines (or segments) that have to be constructed in
order to solve a geometrical problem. Still, Descartes seems to imply that the very last
step in the construction of circles and straight lines (or segments) has to depend on the
application of one of the constructive clauses of elementary constructions.54 Hence, it is
54An example can be useful to better explain my understanding of Descartes’ claim. Compare Vie`te’s
and Pappus solution of the angle trisection problem (both related in section 1.3.1). They both involve
a non-elementary construction. But the reasons for the constructions involved in these solutions are
non-elementary are essentially different from each other. The construction involved in the former is a
non-elementary one, since it includes the construction of a segment (the segment FE: fig. 1) under the
supposition that some EPG objects are given (the circle of centre B and radius BE, the point E on it,
and the segment BD), these objects being such that no constructive clause of elementary constructions
licenses constructing this segment under the supposition that they are given. The construction involved
in the latter is non-elementary, instead, since it includes the construction of an hyperbola, which is not
an EPG object (cf. footnote 40, above). Once this hyperbola is constructed, its intersection point D
with the relevant circle (fig. 3) is ipso facto constructed, as it happens in elementary constructions for the
intersection points of segments and circles. And, once this point is given, the construction continues as
an elementary one. Namely, the segments AD and EF, on which the trisection depends, are constructed
according to the constructive clauses of elementary constructions Hence, whereas Vie`te’s construction
includes a step in which a segment is constructed according to a constructive clause which is not included
among those of elementary constructions, the very last step in the construction of any segment and circle
involved in Pappus’s construction depends on the application of one of the constructive clauses of elemen-
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only by admitting the possibility of obtaining some non-EPG objects, namely some curves
other than circles, that one can go, for him, beyond the limits of these constructions. This
is the same as denying the rightfulness of quasi-elementary constructions. Descartes seems
thus to consider that these constructions have either to be recast under the form of strictly
non-elementary ones, or ipso facto discarded.55
His insistence on instruments used in the tracing way is not enough, however, to discard
strictly non-elementary constructions which do not appeal to instruments, since the curves
involved in these constructions could be also traceable through appropriate instruments.
Hence, according to Descartes, the search for new exactness norms to be added to those
of EPG results in a double purpose: to identify an appropriate class of instruments to be
used in the tracing way for obtaining curves other than circles; to establish whether some
curves obtained in some other ways could also be traced by these instruments. This double
purpose results, in turn, from a double reduction: the question of fixing the non-elementary
constructions to be admitted in geometry is first reduced to the question of identifying the
curves other than circles that are to be admitted in geometry; this question is then reduced
to that of identifying a class of instruments that, when used in the tracing way, trace curves
that are admitted in geometry just because they can be so traced. Descartes famously terms
these curves ‘geometrical’ (Descartes (1637), 319; Descartes (AT), VI, 392)56. For short,
let us also call ‘geometrical linkages’ the instruments to be used to trace these same curves
(arguments justifying this denomination will be offered later).
Here is how Descartes characterises these instruments (Descartes (1637), 316-317; Descartes
(AT), VI, 389-390)57:
[. . . ] mais il est, ce me semble, tres clair que, prenant, comme on fait, pour
Geometrique ce qui est precis et exact, et pour Mechanique ce qui ne l’est pas;
et conside´rant la Geometrie comme une science qui enseigne generalement a
connoistre les mesures de tous les cors; on n’en doit pas plutost exclure les
lignes les plus compose´es que les plus simples, pourvuˆ qu’on les puisse imaginer
estre descrites par un mouvement continu, ou par plusieurs qui s’entresuivent et
tary constructions. According to my understanding, Descartes’ point is that constructions like the former
are not admissible.
55I shall come back to the possible reasons for this exclusion in section 2.3.
56This second reduction produces an asymmetry first remarked by Mancosu (Mancosu (2007), 114-121,
esp. 117; Mancosu (1996), 71-79) and discussed in Mancosu and Arana (2010): to show how to trace a
curve through a geometrical linkage is enough to establish that it is, but ignorance regarding the possibility
of tracing a curve through such a linkage is not enough to establish that it is not so.
57Because of the relevance of this passage, I prefer to quote it in the original French; slightly different
translations are offered in: Descartes (GDSL), 43-44; Bos (2001), 338, 341; Mancosu (1996), 71-72.
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dont les derniers soient entierement regle´s par ceux qui les precedent: car, par
ce moyen, on peut toujours avoir une connaissance exacte de leur mesure. [. . . ]
la Spirale, la Quadratrice, et semblables [. . . ] n’appartiennent veritablement
qu’aux Mecaniques et ne sont point du nombre de celles que je pense devoir icy
estre receues, a cause qu’on les imagine descrites par deux mouvements separe´s
et qui n’ont entre eux aucun rapport qu’on puisse mesurer exactement [. . . ].
Descartes’ discussion of proportions compasses in book II is intended to illustrate this
passage. Hence, it is not only natural to wonder how this characterisation should be
understood, but also why this compass illustrates it.58
All the responses offered to these questions agree on a fundamental statement which I
also share: Descartes requires that geometrical linkages be such that the motions of all their
parts depend on a unique principal motion which determines any other motion, including
those of the tracing points59.
This condition is clearly illustrated by proportions compasses (whose principal motion
is the rotation of ruler AQ). But these compasses also meet other conditions. One of them is
that, if they move, each of their motions can only follow a unique and perfectly determinate
trajectory, to the effect that the speed and direction of these motions have no influence on
58The interplay between general standards of rational conceivability and intrinsically geometrical re-
quirements (including faithfulness to the spirit of EPG) that is typical to Descartes’ geometry is evident in
his characterisation of geometrical linkages and curves. Characterising geometrical linkages is certainly not
enough to explain why Descartes considers curves traced by them to be admissible in an “exact” science
like (pure) geometry, that is, why he considers them to be exactly conceivable: this is a question about
Descartes’ epistemology that cannot be settled by considering only his geometry. But, on the other hand,
no account of his general notion of rational conceivability can be enough to understand his characterisation
of geometrical linkages and curves. Two examples are enough to explain why. Domski (Domski (2009),
123) emphasises the role played in Descartes’ geometry by “a standard of intelligibility grounded on simple
and clearly conceivable motions”, and suggests that geometrical curves are those that can be obtained
through an “intelligible motion”. Arana (Arana (Forthcoming)) suggests, instead, that for Descartes “con-
structed objects are known best when the construction is carried out in a way that is fully present to the
attentive constructing mind”. Both suggestions are worthful. But they leave entirely open the problem
of understanding what makes, for Descartes, some motions simple and clearly conceivable in geometry,
or some geometrical constructions fully present to the attentive mind. My upcoming discussion could be
taken as a tentative clarification of these matters.
59A similar point in made in a famous letter to Beeckman of March 16th, 1619, where Descartes claims
that the curves described by his instruments “result from one single motion”, whereas other curves like
the quadratrix are “generated by different motions not subordinate to one other” (Descartes (AT), X, 157;
Bos (2001), 231). Using the terminology of modern mathematical analysis, one could say that this motion
is the independent motion among those that the different parts of the instrument are submitted to, in the
same sense in which x is the independent variable relative to a function y = f(x).
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the curves they trace (since these curves are just the trajectories that the motions of some
points taken on the compasses are constrained to follow, if these compasses move)60.
Descartes does not mention this condition—probably because he (wrongly) takes it to
be entailed by the previous one—, but he clearly requires that all geometrical linkages meet
it. It follows that the curves traced by each of the tracing points of a geometrical linkage is,
by definition, univocally determined regardless of the way this same linkage is set in motion.
This is also the case of straight lines and circles, if they are taken to be traced by rulers
and compasses (respectively conceived as fixed bars on which a tracing point moves, and as
rotating bars on which a tracing point is fixed). I suggest that this is the essential feature
that, according to Descartes, geometrical curves share with straight lines and circles: they
have to be traceable by instruments so conceived that, if they move, their tracing points are
constrained to follow some determinate trajectories which are independent of their actual
motion (that is, both of the fact that they actually move, and of the direction and speed
with which they possibly do), to the effect that this is also the case of the curves they
trace, which are nothing but these same trajectories61. Geometrical linkages have then to
be instruments like these, i.e. mere tools capable of fixing such trajectories.
But, though necessary, this and the previous condition stated in Descartes’ quote are
still not sufficient to characterise geometrical linkages. To understand why, consider the
instrument for tracing spirals that Huygens sketched in his notebook in 1650, possibly
after having heard about it from Descartes himself (Bos (2001), 345, 347-349; Mancosu
and Arana (2010), § 3; Huygens’ sketch is reproduced in fig. 12, which is taken from Bos
(2001), 348). A ruler AF is left free to rotate around a fixed pole B, in which a fixed disk C
is centred; a string is attached to the disk at the top extremity E of it and goes up to the
moving extremity A of the ruler, then comes back along the ruler itself up to a tracing pin
D which is left free to slide on this ruler. Initially, the ruler stands horizontally on the left
of the disk and the tracing pin is placed in the pole. While it rotates counter-clockwise,
the string winds up around the disk and pulls the tracing pin, so that it traces an arc of
spiral.
This instrument meets the condition for geometrical instruments explicitly stated in
Descartes’ passage quoted above. Its principal motion is the rotation of the ruler AF, and
it is then constrained to follow a determinate trajectory, indicated for example by the
60Proportions compasses seem however to have an initial position from which the rotating ruler can only
move in one direction. I shall come back to this matter later.
61Serfati (Serfati (1993), 227-228) has similarly argued that in the “generation” of curves through geo-
metrical linkages only “the automatism” of such an instrument is at issue, whereas the generation of spirals
and quadratrices require “a thinking subject that, at any instant, brings together two movements [. . . ] in
her/his hand”.
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circle described by the point A during this rotation. Moreover, the speed of this motion
has no influence on the trajectory followed by the tracing pin D, which is the curve traced
by this instrument. Still, this trajectory, and then this curve, are not independent of the
direction with which the principal motion describes its trajectory, since, for the pin D to
move, the ruler AF has to turn counter-clockwise. But suppose that the string is replaced
by a wire so conceived that the tracing pin D also moves if the ruler AF rotates clockwise
by going either forwards or backwards along this ruler according whether this same ruler
rotates counter-clockwise or clockwise. The new instrument that is so gotten is such that
the trajectory followed by the tracing pin D, and then the curve it traces, are independent
of its actual motion.
Still, Descartes would have not considered it as a geometrical linkage: it is likely that
he knew Huygens’ original instrument and nevertheless considered the spiral not to be a
geometrical curve; and, it is also likely that he would have not changed his mind if he had
imagined the previous modification.
Though Descartes never mentions Huygens’ instrument, he considers instruments in-
volving strings, and he argues that the curves they trace should be taken to be geometrical
if strings are used “to determine the equality or difference of two or more straight lines
which can be drawn from each point of the sought after curve to certain other points or
toward other lines at certain angles”. He also adds that “one cannot accept [in geometry]
any lines which are like strings, that is to say which become sometimes straight and some-
times curved” (Descartes (1637), 340; Descartes (AT), VI, 412; Bos (2001), 347; Mancosu
(2007), 118).
The string involved in Huygens’ instrument is not used as required in the former of
these passages, and rather behaves as it is said in the latter. Many scholars have then
argued that Descartes does not consider this or similar instruments to be geometrical
linkages just for this reason. For Descartes, curves which “become sometimes straight
and sometimes curved” are not geometrical because “the proportion between straight lines
and curves [. . . ][is] not known, and [. . . ][will never] be so to man” (Descartes (1637), 340;
Descartes (AT), VI, 412; Bos (2001), 347; Mancosu (2007), 118). Hence, these scholars
argue that Descartes’ motivation for discarding these instruments depends on his agreement
with this old Aristotelian dogma: he would admit that segments and arcs of curves are
incommensurable magnitudes or, at least, magnitudes that stay to each other in an exactly
unknowable proportion, and he would then discard these instruments alleging that the
proportion between the straight and curved parts of their strings is exactly unknowable.
This is Bos’ view. Moreover, Bos thinks that Descartes’ “separation between geometrical
and non-geometrical curves [. . . ] rested ultimately on his conviction that proportions
between curves and straight lengths cannot be known exactly” (Bos (2001), 342, 349).
This view is problematic. Mancosu (Mancosu (2007), 119; cf. also Mancosu (1996),
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77) has contrasted it by observing that “the algebraic rectification of certain algebraic
curves in the 1650s did not undermine the foundations of Descartes’ Geometry”. More
specifically, one could also remark that there is no need for the proportion of the straight
and curved parts of the string entering into Huygens’ instrument to be known in order for
this instrument to work. It is only necessary to know this proportion in order to char-
acterise the curve which is traced independently of the instrument itself. But to require
that geometrical linkages trace curves that could be characterised independently of them
would be the same as inverting the definitional order between geometrical linkages and
curves, characterising the former on the basis of the latter, rather than vice-versa. Hence,
either Descartes’ characterisation of geometrical curves does not rest, in fact, on his char-
acterisation of geometrical linkages, or the previous reason for discarding instruments like
Huygens’ is not sound.
I take the latter to be true, and suggest that the reason that Descartes discards these
instruments is another one. To understand it, consider proportions compasses again. Con-
ceived as material devices, they cannot but be composed of a finite number of finite rulers.
Still, they can also be conceived as abstract systems, i.e. as appropriate configurations of
an infinite number of straight lines that move by meeting some incidence conditions and
without any force being exerted. And, if they are so conceived, AQ can move indefinitely
on both sides of AP so that points Ki (i = 1, 2, . . .) trace infinitely many curves infinitely
extended. The previous discussion of Huygens’ instrument and of its modified version
should make clear, instead, that they cannot be so conceived, since their mechanical na-
ture is essential for them to work. Not only does their working depend on the physical
properties of their strings or wires, and not only must their ruler AF have an extremity
or some sort of hub around which such a string or wire passes, what is more relevant is
that these instruments are so designed to work only insofar as some forces are exerted by
and upon their components. Moreover, there is no room to suppose that their motion be
indefinitely continued so as to trace an entire spiral.
There is thus an essential difference between instruments like Huygens’s and proportions
compasses: the latter can be conceived as purely geometrical systems that are taken to move
and to trace entire curves because of their motion; the former are intrinsically mechanical
devices that cannot but trace finite arcs of curves. I suggest that, for Descartes, geometrical
linkages are instruments like the latter and not like the former: they are—or at least they
can be conceived as—moving configurations of geometrical objects.
It is enough to admit that the term ‘line’ refers to geometrical objects (which is quite
natural) for recognising this idea rather explicitly expressed in something Descartes writes
before mentioning the proportions compasses for the first time (Descartes (1637), 316;
Descartes (AT), VI, 389; Bos (2001), 338): “nothing else needs to be supposed to trace all
the curves that I purport to introduce here than that two or several lines can be moved
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one by the other and that their intersection mark some other ones [. . . ]”. In the diagrams
included in the Ge´ome´trie, rulers entering into geometrical linkages are represented by
double strokes, which evokes their thickness. Still, this passage seems to say that they
are—or at least can be conceived as—nothing but straight lines or segments.
Another textual evidence supporting my suggestion is offered by what Descartes writes
a little later, concerning the way the ancients used the term ‘mechanical curves’ (Descartes
(1637), 315-316; Descartes (AT), VI, 389). He argues that this use cannot be justified by
observing that the curves the ancients termed ‘mechanical’ are traced by instruments which
are too “complicated [compose´]” for being “right [iustes ]”. He then adds that this should
rather suggest rejecting these curves from mechanics, since it is there that “the rightness
of the works made with hands is desired”, whereas in geometry “only the rightness of
reasoning is pursued”, and rightness of reasoning can be as “perfect” about the curves
traced by such instruments as it is about straight lines, circles and conics. This suggests
that, for Descartes, the relevant properties of the instruments tracing geometrical curves
and of these same curves do not depend on the material features of these instruments, but
rather on the way they are conceived by “reasoning”.
If this double textual evidence is taken to be weak, consider that it is a matter of fact
that Descartes rules out instruments including strings working as in Huygens’, and that the
reason usually invoked to justify this exclusion is both implausible and unsound, whereas
the reason I suggest does not seem to be so.
This reason agrees, moreover, with Descartes’ admission that some instruments, in-
cluding strings, can trace geometrical curves. Descartes’ point is, indeed, just this, and
not that these instruments are geometrical linkages. As examples, he mentions the in-
struments evoked in the Dioptrique “in order to explain the ellipse and the hyperbola”
(Descartes (1637), 340; Descartes (AT), VI, 412). These are the instruments entering into
the gardener’s constructions of these curves. Descartes terms them “very coarse and not
very exact” but still maintains that they are such as “to make [. . . ] the nature [of these
curves] better known” (Descartes (1637), 89-90, 100-101; Descartes (AT), VI, 166, 176).
This suggests that Descartes takes these constructions to be capable of fixing the nature of
these curves, but still not to be admissible in geometry, as such. I explain this as follows:
these constructions rely on intrinsically mechanical devices but suggest two instruments
involving no string, which also trace these curves and meet all the previous conditions
for being geometrical linkages. These are two anti-parallelograms ABECD (fig. 13) whose
side AB is fixed, while sides AC and BD rotate together around A and B, being linked by
side DC, so that these curves are traced by their intersection point E. Descartes’ claim
seems thus that some curves traced by instruments including strings are geometrical not
because these instruments are themselves geometrical linkages, but because they suggest
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geometrical linkages tracing these curves.62
To admit that geometrical linkages are—or can be conceived as—moving configurations
of geometrical objects is of course not enough to characterise them. But, I argue that it
is neither enough to add, according to what has been said above, that: a) the motions of
all their parts depend on a unique principal motion; b) they include one or more tracing
points, and, if they move, these tracing points are constrained to follow some determinate
trajectories which are independent of their actual motion, to the effect that this is also
the case of the curves they trace, which are nothing but these same trajectories. What
makes a moving configuration meeting these conditions a geometrical linkage (i.e. an
instrument that traces a geometrical curve in Descartes’ sense) is, I hold, that it can be
obtained through a licensed construction.63 More precisely, I argue that such a moving
configuration is a geometrical linkage if and only if it can be constructed in an arbitrary
position through a licensed construction. This condition needs clarification.
A first point to be clarified is concerned with the requirement that such a moving
configuration be constructed in an arbitrary position. This means that what has to be
constructed is the fixed configuration of geometrical objects that constitutes the position
it takes when an arbitrary respective position of the objects directly involved in its principal
motion is chosen, in such a way that these objects do not coincide with each other, and
its invariant components are allowed to meet the conditions they are possibly required to
meet. The construction has thus to begin from these objects taken in such an arbitrary
position.
Consider two examples.
The first is provided by the proportions compass. The objects directly involved in its
principal motion are the rulers AP and AQ (fig. 11.1). Whatever their respective positions
might be, the invariant distance AK0 can be determined as required. Hence, the construc-
tion of such a compass can start by choosing any arbitrary respective position of these
rulers, provided they do not coincide.
The second example is less simple. It concerns the “compass” Descartes describes in the
Cogitationes Privatæ (together with the proportions one) by suggesting using it to solve
the angle trisection problem (Descartes (AT), X, 213-256, esp. 234-240; Serfati (1993),
205-212; Bos (2001), 237-245).64 Call it ‘trisection compass’. It includes four rulers AB,
62A similar point is made by Molland: Molland (1976), 42.
63It is quite usual to argue that Descartes’ linkages are “idealised instruments” to be “imagined” (cf.
Molland (1976), 42, for example). My point is quite different. I hold them to be geometrical objects
requiring (diagrammatic) construction, rather than mere imagination.
64The Cogitationes Privatæ date back to 1619. The same compass is also mentioned in the letter to
Beeckman of March 26th of the same year (Descartes (AT), X, 154-160, esp 154-156) as being part of a
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AC, AD, AE (fig. 14) the first three of which are rotating around a common pole A, and
the fourth is fixed. On them, the points F, I, K, L are taken at equal distance from A,
and at these points four other rulers, all equal to AL, are respectively attached so that
those attached to F and K are also attached to the same point G sliding on AC, those
attached to I and L are also attached to the same point H sliding on AD. If AL is such that
AC is able to come full circle around A starting from being coincident with AE, while AC
so turns, G traces the curve MGPAQR.65 This compass is certainly a geometrical linkage.
Still, if one wanted to construct it starting by choosing an arbitrary respective position of
rulers AE and AB, its construction would require either already having solved the angle
trisection problem, or using the rulers composing this compass as physical devices that
exert appropriate forces upon each other. If one starts, instead, by choosing an arbitrary
respective position of rulers AE and AD and fixing L on the former so that AL is long
enough, the compass can be constructed through an easy elementary construction. It is
thus constructible in a licensed way only if its principal motion is taken to be the rotation
of AD.
A second point to be clarified concerns the curves that the construction of geometrical
linkages relies on, possibly. Return for this purpose to Villalpando’s compass (fig. 9.2),
which is also, certainly, a geometrical linkage. But suppose that, instead of tracing Vil-
lalpando’s locus through it, one wanted to trace this locus through another instrument so
conceived that the tracing point F (fig. 15) is at the intersection of two rotating rulers
OX and EZ. This instrument should be such that OD = OE = EF. To assure this, one
could imagine equipping the instrument with two equal circles, respectively centered in E
and O, and requiring that points D and F slide on them. But, as OD varies, the radii of
these circles should also vary. If the instrument were conceived as a material device, it
would thus be very hard to build, and it should in any case be made of some appropriate
deformable stuff. If it were conceived as a moving configuration of geometrical objects all
of whose motions depend on a principal one, it should include some system of lines used
to transform the rotation of OX or EZ into the increasing of the radii of these circles. Vil-
lalpando’s compass (fig. 9.2) works in a much simpler way, since it transmits its principal
family of compasses, each of which is to be used to solve the n-section problem for a certain positive integer
n.
65This is a sextic curve with equation 4a4x2 =
(
x2 + y2
) (
x2 + y2 − 2a2)2, with respect to orthogonal
co-ordinates of origin A and axis AE, with a = AL (Bos (2001), 238, footnote (20)). The trisecting compass
stands to the angle trisection problem in the same relation as the proportions compass stands to the mean
proportionals problems: it can be used to solve the former problem both in the pointing and in the tracing
way, but this problem can also be solved (as said in section 1.3.1) by relying on simpler curves, namely on
circles and conics.
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motion (the rotation of IM or JM) into the motion of F without relying on any circle. This
shows that there is no need to appeal to changing circles in order to assure that, while a
linkage moves, some segments included in it remain equal, though varying in length. One
can rather use appropriate configurations of rotating segments or straight lines meeting
some conditions of orthogonality.
But there are other purposes for which circles can enter into geometrical linkages. An
example is gotten if Villalpando’s compass is transformed by replacing the ruler IM with a
circle of diameter IJ on which M is required to slide. This transformation has no influence
on the curve which is traced. The new instrument is thus a geometrical linkage including
a fixed circle. Hence, the inverse transformation shows that fixed circles can enter into
geometrical linkages in such a way that they can be replaced by rulers without influence
on the curve which is traced. But there are also cases of geometrical linkages including
circles that cannot be replaced by other components without influence on the curve which
is traced. An example including a circle moving rigidly is provided by Descartes himself
(Descartes (1637), 322; Descartes (AT), VI, 395): a ruler GL (fig. 16.1) rotates around a
fixed pole G while the point L slides on it so as to stay at its intersection with another
fixed ruler AB; to L is attached another ruler LK that slides with this point on AB; to K
is attached a circle KCM; the intersection point C of this circle and the ruler GL traces a
curve PCQ which is a conchoid of a straight line.
Descartes comes to this example by modifying a simpler instrument including, instead
of the circle KCM, a straight line KC (fig. 16.2) forming a fixed acute angle with LK, and
claims that an infinity of similar linkages can be reached from this basic one by replacing
this straight line with any geometrical curve (Descartes (1637), 319-323; Descartes (AT),
VI, 392-395; Serfati (1993), 220-221; Serfati (2002); Bos (2001), 278-281). Following Bos,
call these linkages ‘turning rulers with a moving curve’. The basic one traces a hyperbola;
Descartes first suggests replacing the straight line KC with this same hyperbola, then
continues by suggesting replacing it either with a circle (as said) or with a parabola,
and finally observes that if the linkage includes a geometrical curve of the i-th genus
(i = 1, 2, . . .), it traces a geometrical curve of the (i+ 1)-th genus.
This is wrong (Serfati (2002)), but shows that Descartes admits that geometrical link-
ages can include circles or any other sort of geometrical curves moving rigidly. More gener-
ally, I advance that geometrical linkages can include circles or any other sort of geometrical
curves if and only if these are fixed or move rigidly.
All this finally suggests a necessary and sufficient characterisation of geometrical link-
ages. They are moving configurations of geometrical objects that meet the conditions (a)
and (b) stated above, possibly include, besides straight lines (or segments), also circles and
geometrical curves which are fixed or move rigidly, and can be obtained, together with the
geometrical curves they trace, according to the following recursive procedure.
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Term ‘elementary’ the geometrical linkages that can be constructed in an arbitrary po-
sition through an elementary construction. Say that the curves traced by them are
obtained by a construction of type C[0]. Examples of elementary linkages are usual
compasses, as well as conchoid, proportions, trisection, and Villalpando’s compasses,
and turning rulers with a moving curve where the moving curve is either a straight
line or a circle.
The curves obtained by a construction of type C[0] can enter into new non-elementary
geometrical linkages. These can be constructed in an arbitrary position through a
non-elementary construction including the construction of these curves. This last con-
struction requires that appropriate elementary geometrical linkages be constructed
starting from appropriate given objects in such a position that they trace these curves
in an appropriate position. Say that the curves traced by such new geometrical link-
ages are obtained by a construction of type C[1]. An example is provided by the
already mentioned Cartesian parabola. This is traced by a turning ruler with a mov-
ing curve where the moving curve is a usual parabola of axis AB. The construction
of this last parabola requires that an elementary linkage tracing it be constructed so
as to trace this curve in such a position that its axis coincides with AB and its vertex
with K.
The procedure can continue indefinitely in the same way: the curves obtained by a con-
struction of type C[1] can enter into further geometrical linkages tracing curves that
are then obtained by a construction of type C[2], etc.
If these clauses are combined with those of elementary construction—by admitting, for
example, that a point can be constructed by intersection of a geometrical curve and a given
segment or circle—, one gets a new sort of diagrammatic non-elementary constructions.66
I suggest terming them ‘constructions by ruler, compass, and reiteration’. They allow one
to obtain two essentially distinct sorts of objects which populate Descartes’ geometry: the
former are fixed objects, i.e. EPG objects and geometrical curves; the latter are moving
objects, i.e. geometrical linkages. The former can interact with each other both in theorem-
proving and in problem-solving. The latter are, instead, not supposed to interact with each
66The diagrammatic nature of these constructions is made manifest by the example of the non-elementary
linkage generating the Cartesian parabola just described. It is clear, indeed, that the combination of the
motion of the elementary linkage that traces the ordinary parabola which enters into this non-elementary
linkage with the motion of this last linkage does not make such a parabola move rigidly as it is supposed
to do within this same linkage. Hence the motion of this ordinary parabola is not merely produced by the
combination of the motions of the two linkages and can only be conceived, in fact, as the motion of the
diagram that represents it.
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other, and a single geometrical linkage interacts with some fixed objects only if it includes
them, is constructed starting from them, or traces one of them.
Both fixed objects and geometrical linkages can be unconditional or conditional. Descartes
is not explicit about the conditions under which they are available within his geometry.
Still, it seems natural to admit that: i) unconditional geometrical linkages and curves are
available within Descartes’ geometry by definition (since they are geometrical linkages and
curves just insofar as they can be constructed by ruler, compass and reiteration, which
is what makes them available within Descartes’ geometry); ii) unconditional EPG ob-
jects, conditional geometrical linkages, and conditional fixed objects are available within
Descartes’ geometry if they can be constructed by ruler, compass and reiteration, possibly
starting from the given objects that the conditions involved in the corresponding concepts
are concerned with. These are, I hold, the exactness norms that Descartes’ geometry is
based on.
2.3. Descartes on non-elementary constructions
We can now explain Descartes’ attitude with respect to the six sorts of non-elementary
constructions distinguished in section 1.3.4.
A first point is clear: a construction involving curves described as trajectories of motions
is licensed for him if and only if it is a construction by ruler, compass and reiteration, or
can be recast under the form of such a construction.
Concerning quasi-elementary constructions, I have already said that he rejects them
from the very beginning. But it still remains to understand why.
For those relying on some explicit stipulations or tacit admissions working as construc-
tive clauses, the more plausible reason seems that he considers them as merely unjustified,
insofar as they are based on ad hoc assumptions. Hence, either they can be appropriately
recast, or they have to be discarded.
For those relying on instruments used in the pointing way the situation is more delicate.
As a matter of fact, Descartes admits geometrical curves by force of their being traceable
through geometrical linkages. But then–one could plausibly wonder—, why does he not also
admit constructions appealing to other, similar, instruments, so conceived as to be used
in the pointing way? Of course, to substantiate this question, one should better explain
the nature of these instruments, or, at least, the sense in which they might be considered
as similar to geometrical linkages. Presumably, one could take these instruments to be,
like geometrical linkages, nothing but moving configurations of geometrical objects, or at
least to be such that one could conceive them as moving configurations of geometrical
objects. But then, a possible reason for Descartes to reject constructions appealing to such
instruments could be the following: in order to use moving configurations of geometrical
objects in the pointing way one has to assign to the diagrams representing these objects a
46
role quite different from the role played by diagrams both in elementary constructions and
in constructions by ruler, compass, and reiteration. The conditions under which moving
configurations of geometrical objects used in the pointing way would allow one to obtain
the objects required could indeed not be imposed on these diagrams, but should rather be
acknowledged by inspecting them.
A simple example is provided by Eratosthenes’s solution to the two mean proportionals
problem considered in section 1.3.2. As I have noted in this section, one could imagine
replacing the plates involved in this solution with genuine geometrical rectangles. But, as
I also noted on the same occasion, this would make no relevant difference, since this would
require using the diagrams representing these rectangles in such a way that the relevant
conditions that these rectangles are supposed to meet are acknowledged by inspecting these
diagrams rather than imposed on them.
The point here is that, even if this acknowledgement were conceived as a purely ideal
procedure, it would remain essentially different from any procedure entering elementary
constructions or constructions by ruler, compass and reiteration. Hence, supposing that
Descartes’ reason for rejecting quasi-EPG constructions appealing to instruments used in
the pointing way was the previous one, his rejection of these constructions would depend
on his purpose of staying as close as possible to Euclid’s setting, and then excluding con-
structions structurally too different from EPG ones.
Consider now Descartes’ attitude with respect to strictly non-elementary constructions.
Those involving univocally determined conics are of course admitted by Descartes, since
they can be easily recast under the form of constructions by ruler, compass and reiteration.
Something similar holds for generic point-wise constructions. These involve loci of
points which are generated by other points or straight lines. Consider such a locus and
suppose that it is the locus of a point that can be constructed, in an arbitrary position, by
ruler, compass and reiteration, and it is generated by another point, so constructed in turn.
It is then likely that the construction of these two points suggests a way for constructing
a geometrical linkage to be used to trace this locus. The case of Villalpando’s locus and
compass provides an example. Descartes seems to think of a situation like this when he
alleges to have “furnished a way to describe” a curve, by “having explained the way of
finding an infinite number of points though which” it passes, and adds that “this way
of finding a curve by finding several of its points at random applies only to those curves
which can also be described by a regular and continuous motion” (Descartes (1637), 339-
340; Descartes (AT), VI, 411-412; Bos (2001), 344-345; Domski (2009), 125-129). One could
then conclude that generic point-wise constructions of a curve are admitted by Descartes
if and only if the curve is also traceable by a geometrical linkage suggested by the very
construction.
The situation is different for strictly non-elementary constructions involving curves
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obtained by interpolation: however the points on which the interpolation is based are con-
structed, their construction provides no suggestion for constructing a geometrical linkage
to be used to trace these curves. Hence, these constructions have to be rejected (if they
cannot be appropriately recast). Also on this matter, Descartes is explicit enough. In
the Ge´ome´trie, he remarks that in these constructions “one does not find indifferently all
points of the sought after curve”, so that, “strictly speaking, one does not find a [generic]
point of it, that is, not one of those that which are so peculiarly points of it that they
cannot be found except by means of it” (Descartes (1637), 340; Descartes (AT), VI, 411;
Bos (2001), 344). Even more clearly, in writing to Mersenne on November 13th 1629, he
argues that “although one could find an infinity of points through which the helix or the
quadratrix must pass, one cannot find geometrically any one of those points which are
necessary for the desired effect”, so that these curves “cannot be traced completely except
by the intersection of two movements” (Descartes (AT), I, 71; Mancosu and Arana (2010),
footnote 10 and the relative quote).
3. Concluding Remarks: Descartes’ Geometry and EPG
Whereas the exactness norms stated at the end of section 2.2 fix the bounds of Descartes’
geometrical ontology, the attitudes just described fix the constraints imposed by this ontol-
ogy on the exercise of the most common sorts of constructions in classical geometry. This
is the same as fixing the bounds that have to be respected in solving geometrical prob-
lems. But it is much less than fixing a general method for solving geometrical problems,
prescribing the appropriate way to solve each problem: such a method has to conform to
these bounds, but these bounds are not enough to set it. Here is where simplicity and al-
gebra come into account, thanks to the assumption that geometrical curves are just those
that can be expressed, with respect to an appropriate system of lineal co-ordinates, by
two-variable polynomial equations.
This assumption also suggests a way to re-state the bound of Descartes’ geometrical
ontology in a more convenient way, which, as a matter of fact, has been historically promi-
nent after Descartes. This leads to the problem of the relations between constructions by
rulers, compass and reiteration and Descartes’ algebra. This problem has been differently
stated and tackled many times, and I cannot enter into it. My present enquiry can suggest,
at most, a way to formulate it anew.
Typically, unconditional geometrical linkages are defined by Descartes by describing
how to construct them. Their definition comes thus together with the proof that these
linkages are available within this geometry. Hence, if unconditional geometrical curves of a
certain sort are defined as the curves traced by a certain sort of unconditional geometrical
linkages so defined, also the definition of these curves goes together with the proof that they
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are available within this geometry. The same happens if unconditional geometrical curves
of a certain sort are defined as the curves expressed, with respect to any system of lineal
co-ordinates, by equations of a certain form. In both cases, no need arises, then, of stating
and solving problems concerned with the concepts of the different sorts of unconditional
geometrical curves.
For conditional geometrical curves, things go in a slightly different way. They can be
defined either by specifying conditional geometrical linkages purporting to trace them, or by
providing equations including coefficients which refer to some supposedly given segments,
and purporting to express these curves with respect to appropriate systems of lineal co-
ordinates. In the former case, to prove that these curves are available within Descartes’
geometry, one has merely to prove that the relevant linkages are so. In the latter, one has
to prove that the relevant system of co-ordinates is also available within this geometry
(which means that its origin, its axis and its angle are so), and the relevant equations can
be determined.
As an example, consider the geometrical curves traced by proportions compasses. If
they are unconditional, they can be defined either as the curves traced by unconditional
proportions compasses, or as curves expressed, with respect to any system of orthogonal
lineal co-ordinates, by equations of the form x4n = a2 (x2 + y2)
2n−1
, where ‘n’ stands for
any natural number and ‘a’ stands for any segment. It is enough to define these curves
in one of these two ways to warrant that they are available within Descartes’ geometry.
If they are conditional, they can be defined either as the curves traced by conditional
proportions compasses—i.e. a proportions compasses whose element AK0 (fig. 11.1) is
required to be equal to a supposedly given segment and which is possibly so placed so as
to trace this curve in an appropriate position—, or as the curves expressed, with respect
to a certain determinate system of orthogonal lineal co-ordinates, by equations of the
form x4n = a2 (x2 + y2)
2n−1
, where ‘n’ stands for any natural number and ‘a’ denotes
a supposedly given segment. To prove that these curves are available within Descartes’
geometry, one has to prove either that these conditional proportions compasses are available
within Descartes’ geometry, or that this is the case for this system of co-ordinates and for
the segment denoted by ‘a’.
These considerations are enough for showing that the relation between definitions and
exactness norms of geometrical objects is different in Descartes’ geometry than in EPG.
Whereas problems complying with the ontological function67 are indispensable ingredients
of EPG, in Descartes’ geometry there is no room for new problems complying with this
function (unless some unconditional geometrical curves are defined in ways different to the
67Cf. section 1.2, above, especially p. 18.
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two mentioned above). Insofar as, in Descartes’ geometry as well as in EPG, problems ask
for constructions, all of them comply with the constructive function68. Still, proving new
constructive clauses is far less important in the former geometry than in latter. On the other
hand, in Descartes’ geometry there is room for problems asking for the identification and
construction of the geometrical linkages tracing the curves expressed by certain equations or
sorts of equations (or for the determination of the equations expressing the curves traced
by certain geometrical linkages or sorts of geometrical linkages), which are absent from
EPG.
Despite these structural differences, the identity conditions of geometrical linkages and
curves are, like those of EPG objects, only local and reduce to the identity conditions of
the corresponding diagrams. Hence, also geometrical linkages and curves do not form a
fixed domain of quantification and individual reference, in the sense explained in section
1.1: each time one wants to refer individually to some of them, these have to be obtained,
or supposed to have been obtained anew.69
68Cf. section 1.2, above, especially p. 19.
69If one adds that, in Descartes’ geometry, both geometrical linkages and geometrical curves are obtained
through constructions by rulers, compass, and reiteration, and that these constructions enclose elementary
constructions, one should understand why I take this geometry to be a conservative extension of EPG, in
the informal sense explained in section 1.3. But one could also wonder whether Descartes’ geometry could
also be said to be a conservative extension of EPG in some stronger sense. In modern logic, one says that
a (formal) theory T ∗ is a conservative extension of a (formal) theory T if and only if the language of T ∗
includes that of T and any theorem of T ∗ formulated in the language of T is also a theorem of T . (This
last requirement might not be equivalent to the requirement that any logical consequence of the axioms
of T ∗ formulated in the language of T be also a logical consequence of the axioms of T . For example, this
is not so for second order theories. In this case, one can define two distinct senses in which a theory is a
conservative extension of another one. I cannot enter these logical subtleties here.) One could then wonder
whether Descartes’ geometry could be said to be a conservative extension of EPG in some sense close to
this one. To try to respond to this question, one can reason as follows. Take G to be a a conservative
extension of EPG in the informal sense explained in section 1.3. Suppose that the solution of any problem
in G is converted into a theorem asserting that the objects whose construction provides this same solution
are available within G (i.e. can be obtained in a licensed way according to the exactness norms proper
to G). Insofar as G is a conservative extension of EPG in the previous sense, some of the theorems that
are obtained in this way will be relative to EPG objects available within EPG (one of these theorems will
assert, for example, that equilateral triangles are available within G). It is obvious that any theorem like
these corresponds to a theorem asserting that the same objects are available within EPG. But, of course,
this is not enough for G to be a conservative extension of EPG in a sense close to the modern formal one.
One could even argue that this does not happen any time that G is such that some EPG objects which
are not available within EPG are instead available within G. But suppose now that, despite being so,
G is also such that any theorem that can be proved in it about EPG objects available within EPG (and
then also within G itself) might also be proved in EPG. In this case, one could say that G is, after all, a
conservative extension of EPG in another sense close to the modern logical one. An interesting question
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Still, the fact that geometrical curves can be defined as the curves expressed by equa-
tions allows a new modality of reference to these curves. One can refer to a plurality of
curves through expressions like ‘the curves expressed by equations of degree 3’, or ‘the
curves expressed by equations of the form x4n = a2 (x2 + y2)
2n−1
’. This is quite different
from referring to a plurality of geometrical objects through expressions like ‘the triangles’,
‘the parabolas’, or ‘the radii of a given circle’. The difference depends on the fact that
forms of equations are equations, that is, mathematical objects in turn.70 These objects are
essentially different from triangles or geometrical curves. This is not only because they are
not spatial, but overall because they have different identity conditions, and these conditions
are such that they do form a fixed domain of quantification and individual reference, in the
sense explained in section 1.1. Moreover, forms of equations can be variously classified, so
as to provide a large variety of classifications for the corresponding sorts of curves.
Sorts of geometrical curves become, then, mathematical objects of a new kind, es-
sentially different from the geometrical curves themselves. An example will explain the
difference. Classical geometry deals with parabolas, but there is no object in it like the
totality of all the parabolas, or the parabola. There are only particular parabolas differing
in the context of single arguments.71 In Descartes’ algebraic geometry, there is, instead,
an equation providing the canonical form of any equation expressing a parabola, and ad-
mitting a certain range of possible transformations, which is a mathematical object, as
such.
It is hard to overestimate the consequences of this difference on the evolution of math-
ematics. There is room to say that it makes modern mathematics begin. This probably
explains why historians have emphasised the connections between Descartes’ geometry and
modern mathematics much more than they have insisted on its genetic relations with EPG
concerning Descartes’ geometry is whether it is a conservative extension of EPG in this last sense.
70This depends on what Manders has called ‘representational unresponsiveness’ of algebraic literal no-
tation (Manders (2008), 73): the fact that a literal symbol entering into this notation and denoting a
particular object expresses no specific feature of this same object. This is because the same symbol used
to denote a particular geometric object, or a perfectly analogous symbol, can also denote other objects of
the same sort, or stand for any objects of the same sort. It is not the same for the literal symbols used in
classical geometry to denote geometrical objects, that is, for symbols like ‘AB’ used to denote a segment.
The reason is obvious: these symbols are used to denote the objects represented by certain diagrams (either
actually drawn or imagined: cf. footnote (19), above) to which they are relative, and diagrams do not
enjoy representational unresponsiveness.
71One could say that, though there is nothing as the parabola, there is at least the kind of parabola,
understood as a particular kind of conic. Taken as a single object, this is not, however, a mathematical
object, since there is no way to mathematically operate on it, as such. At most, this is the linguistic
hypostasis of a mathematical concept.
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and classical geometry. I have tried, instead, to show some of these relations, by emphasis-
ing structural analogies and differences, and using them to account for Descartes’ attitude
towards geometrical exactness. Though I have presented this attitude as a foundational
one, I did not mean to undermine the centrality of Descartes’ concern for problem-solving.
What I have suggested is rather a way to articulate this concern with his foundational
program.
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Figure 2: Pappus’s Solution of the Angle Trisection Problem
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Figure 4.2: Conchoid of a Straight Line
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Figure 4.3: Conchoid of a Circle
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Figure 5.1: Using Conchoid Compasses in the Pointing Way
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Figure 5.2: Using Conchoid Compasses in the Tracing Way
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Figure 6.1: Eratosthenes’s Solution of the Two Mean Proportionals Problem, Stage 1
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Figure 6.2: Eratosthenes’s Solution of the Two Mean Proportionals Problem, Stage 2
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Figure 6.3: Eratosthenes’s Solution of the Two Mean Proportionals Problem, Stage 3
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Figure 6.4: Eratosthenes’s Solution of the Two Mean Proportionals Problem, Stage 4
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Figure 7: Using Eratosthenes’s Instrument in the Tracing Way
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Figure 8.1: Clavius’s Solution of the Two Mean Proportionals Problem
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Figure 8.2: Instrument Suggested by Clavius’s Solution of the Two Mean Proportionals Problem
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Figure 9.1: Villalpando’s Solution of the Two Mean Proportionals Problem
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Figure 10.1: Quadratrix as Defined by Pappus
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Figure 10.2: Clavius’s Construction of Any Number of Specific Points of a Quadratrix
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Figure 10.3: Dividing an Angle According to a Rational Ratio
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Figure 10.4: Solving the Circle Squaring Problem by Relying on a Quadratrix
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DESCARTES AND THE CYLINDRICAL HELIX 11
FIGURE 2. Huygens’ spiral tracing machine
stated confidently. Firstly, the diagram suggests that B is the center of cylinder BF, and
the description suggests that BF is rotated around B which remains fixed relative to C.
Secondly, there must be some means of ensuring that the stylus DB slides rectilinearly
along AF, perhaps by following a groove carved into the ruler AF. Thirdly, the diagram
suggests that in the initial position of the machine, the ruler AB is orthogonal to the line
BE (though this line does not correspond to any physical part of the machine).
The machine is operated by rotating ruler AF so that the angle EBA increases (moving
A toward the point G in the diagram). As a result, the segment EA is lengthened, and
more string is needed along that segment. Consequently, the stylus DB is pulled along AF,
toward A. Meanwhile, the string along the segment EA wraps around C. The path of the
stylus DB traces an Archimedean spiral.15
Bos suggests that Gaudey’s invention was a machine like Huygens’. We now want to
raise some points against Bos’ interpretation. Firstly, as we said regarding de Waard and
Pintard’s case, it is not clear that Descartes is describing Gaudey’s construction in the
letter, rather than justifying his claim that the ‘helice’ is not a geometrical curve. Secondly,
the connection between Huygens’ machine and Descartes is tenuous. It is possible that
Huygens learned of this machine from Descartes, but there is no evidence that this is so.
Thirdly, Descartes describes the string wrapping around the cylinder “obliquely” [de biais],
but it is not clear what this means for Huygens’ machine. When the handle is turned, the
string wraps around the cylinder, but it is not clear what is oblique about this wrapping.
Lastly, note that Descartes suggests in the letter that the cylinder is geometrical (it “plays
the same role as the circle and straight line”). If Descartes is thinking of the cylinder as a
component of a machine, this seems to imply that we can judge components of machines
15Our description of Huygens’ machine differs slightly from Bos’, but not in a way that affects his argument.
Figure 12: Huygens’ In trument for Tracing Spirals
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Figure 15: Villalpando’s Compass Modified
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Figure 16.1: Turning Ruler with a Moving Circle
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Figure 16.2: Turning Ruler with a Moving Straight Line
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